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I Introduction
Some view the relationship between indigenous peoples and later settlers
as mere byproducts of natural expansion, benevolent philanthropy, divine
religious inspiration, global exploration, paternal supervision, or other
justifications devoid of nefarious intent.' But others see such forgiving
rationales as nothing more than smokescreens designed to obscure a
conscious plan to colonize and eventually eliminate indigenous
communities. 2
Another viewpoint explains the relationship in terms of simple
economics. It is no secret that natural resources translate into money and
allow for a community's survival. Because natural resources are so vital,
an economic battle for control over those natural resources often results
between indigenous and settler communities. Possession of land is crucial
1. See, e.g., AUGIE FLERAS & JEAN LEONARD ELLIOTT, THE NATIONS WITHIN:
ABORIGINAL-STATE RELATIONS IN CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND NEW ZEALAND 3-4
(1992); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES:
AN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 85, 89, 92-94 (1974) [hereinafter DELORIA, BEHIND THE
TRAIL]; JOHN C. MOHAWK & OREN R. LYONS, Introductionto OREN R. LYONS ET AL., EXILED
IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 3

(1992); R. DAVID EDMUNDS, National Expansionfrom the Indian Perspective, in INDIANS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 159 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1988).
2. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH, 1-2, 6-7, 36-37 (1971);
FLERAS & ELLIOTT, supra note 1; FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS,
COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CONQUEST 5-8 (1975); CAROL ARCHIE, MAORI

SOVEREIGNTY: THE PAKEHA PERSPECTIVE 145 (1995) (interview with Steven Young); see
also DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

74 (6th ed.
2011) ("The Colonists required the creation of legal and political relationships with the
tribes in order to legitimate land transactions."); LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER
RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 5 (1991) ("Euro-Americans originally used the law in
combination with military might to strip indigenous peoples of most of their natural
resources.").

3. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Kahn, The Legal Framework Surrounding Maori Claims to
Water Resources in New Zealand: In Contrastto the American Indian Experience, 35 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 49, 52 & nn.6-15 (1999) [hereinafter Kahn, The Legal Framework];Benjamin A.
Kahn, A Place Called Home: Native Sovereignty Through Statehood and Political
Participation, 53 NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Kahn, A Place Called Home]; Benjamin A. Kahn, Separate and

Unequal: EnvironmentalRegulatory Management on Indian Reservations, 35 ENVIRONS 203
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to the survival of independent indigenous nations, since it allows for selfdetermination over matters of internal jurisdiction and the right to secure,
manage, and develop a sustainable economic base. Possession of water, a
natural resource necessary for sustainable life, is similarly crucial to tribal
self-determination.4 Because these rights to natural resources are a basis for
both political and economic power, the inevitable struggle for control over
those resources is not surprising. Such control is simply vital to the
continuing existence of communities that strive for independent political
representation and economic sustainability.5
Settlers often use formal mechanisms, such as governmental and legal
6
frameworks, in an effort to exercise control over tribal natural resources.
These legal frameworks reflect the dominant government's policy agenda
of assuming formal rights over natural resources that were previously under
indigenous dominion.' The dominant government's attempt to gain control
(2012) [hereinafter Kahn, Separate and Unequal]; see also Dan Philpott, Sovereignty,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 31, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/
sovereignty/ ("A final ingredient of sovereignty is territoriality, also a feature of political
authority in modernity. Territoriality is a principle by which members of a community are to
be defined. It specifies that their membership derives from their residence within
borders.... Most vividly contrasting with territoriality is a wandering tribe, whose authority
structure is completely disassociated with a particular piece of land.. .. Supreme authority
within a territory - this is the general definition of sovereignty. Historical manifestations
of sovereignty are almost always specific instances of this general definition.").
4. Compare FLERAs & ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 2 ("Land is the economic bedrock for
the renewal of aboriginal peoples as a distinct society or nation."), and DELORIA, BEHIND
THE TRAIL, supra note 1, at 163, 165, 178, and Whaimutu Dewes, Fisheries- A Case Study
ofan Outcome, in TREATY SETTLEMENTS: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS 134 (Geoff McLay ed.,
1995) (stating that natural resources and knowledge "set the upper bounds on economic
development"), with Michael Parfit, The Chaos of Supply, "Sharing the Wealth of Water",
in Water: The Power, Promise,and Turmoil of North America's Fresh Water, NAT'L GEO.,
Nov. 1993, at 18-36, and Barbara Kingsolver, Fresh Water in Water: Our Thirsty World,
NAT'L GEO., Apr. 2010, at 36-59.

5. Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty FishingRights
of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 375, 393; see also BURTON, supra note 2, at
18; DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL, supra note 1, at 110.
6. Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 3, at 50; Kahn, A Place Called Home,
supra note 3, at manuscript 2.
7. Kahn, A Place CalledHome, supra note 3, at manuscript 2; see also JAMES EDWARD
FITZGERALD, THE NATIVE POLICY OF NEW ZEALAND: A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES OF NEW ZEALAND, AUGUST 6, 1862, at 32 (McKenzie & Muir, 1862) ("[A]
great part of [the Maori] mistrust these [legal, governmental, and political] institutions which
you are inventing for them . .. and it is natural that they should mistrust institutions which
they suppose are invented for our benefit, not for theirs. Should we not think exactly the
same in their place?").
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over indigenous natural resources depends on the legitimacy of legal
frameworks like treaties, contracts, constitutions, and statutes to support
what often boils down to a loss of the indigenous peoples' control over
natural resources.'
When it comes to allocating natural resources, subsequent settlers have
used the law they bring from afar - i.e., westernized legal methods - to
document and justify their division of indigenous economic assets.9 Once
indigenous people find that natural resource rights are subject to both the
imported legal norms and allocation schemes of the settlers, they have to
develop coping and enforcement strategies to deal with the foreign
constructs. While indigenous peoples were often accustomed to occupying
territory and exercising ownership over natural resources, the imported
legal norms of the settlers required external evidence, such as a written
contract or treaty that defined, allocated, and divided natural resource rights
subject to some type of judicial enforcement.'o
But these protection and enforcement options fall within a spectrum of
legal mechanisms that were forced upon indigenous peoples. Indigenous
norms did not reflect property ownership in the same way. Due to this
disparity, indigenous peoples were often left with a stacked deck, and so
one approach to enforcing indigenous natural resource rights has been to
work within the settler-established system by using the dominant culture's
legal parameters as both a shield and a sword in the battle for natural
resource control and protection." The settlers may have designed legal
constructs to their benefit, but indigenous people are adaptable, and those
same foreign legal parameters can be applied offensively in the ongoing
quest for preservation of indigenous natural resource rights.
It is vital for indigenous groups to have control over natural resources, as
such control is a foundation for both economic and political selfsufficiency. This article analyzes a specific approach indigenous groups
can utilize to maintain control over natural resources, which involves
working within the imported statutory process to settle and resolve
8. Tamihana Korokai v. Solicitor-General (1912) 32 N.Z.L.R. 321, 333 (CA); Kahn,
The Legal Framework,supra note 3, at 5 0-52; Kahn, A Place CalledHome, supra note 3, at
manuscript 5; see also FITZGERALD, supra note 7.
9. See Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 3, at 52; Kahn, A Place Called Home,
supra note 3, at manuscript 6.
10. See Kahn, The Legal Framework, supra note 3, at 52; Kahn, A Place Called Home,
supra note 3, at manuscript 6.
11. Kahn, Separate and Unequal, supra note 3, at 205-06, 228-29; Kahn, The Legal
Framework, supra note 3, at 168; Kahn, A Place Called Home, supra note 3, at manuscript
7, 68, 81.
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indigenous natural resource claims. At times, indigenous groups have
simply given in to the imported legal construct to maintain the political and
economic independence that is critical to natural resource control." This
article focuses on one way that indigenous people can work within the
dominant statutory system, while still obtaining favorable results in
resolving natural resource claims - i.e., the legislative claims settlement
13

process.
In the past few decades, there has been an increase in the number of
negotiated legislative settlements. Legislative settlements avoid potential
claims and prevent actual litigation from proceeding. To properly analyze
the legislative claims settlement process, this article examines the fulcrum
of American Indian natural resource claims settlement legislation activity,
which occurred during the 101st Congress from 1989 through 1990. A
detailed history of water-related claims settlements proposals during that
period for the Zuni, Fort McDowell Yavapai, Fort Hall Shoshone Bannock,
Pyramid Lake Paiute, Fallon Paiute Shoshone, Ute, and San Carlos Apache
Indian tribes illustrates the problems and advantages of such legislative
settlements.
Analyzing these natural resource claims from the 101st Congress helps
to illustrate the key components of any successful settlement.
Congressional enthusiasm for legislative claims settlements with Indian
tribes has since ebbed, and the hope for comprehensive Indian natural
resource claims settlement legislation has faded entirely (as opposed to
piecemeal resolutions). This article concludes with a summary of
legislative claims settlement developments, and a view of the best path
forward: the federal government should increase the rate of Indian natural
resource legislative claims settlements as an efficient way to bring
economic closure to historic and costly battles for resource control with
Indian tribes. This is true, even though some may view legislative claims
settlements as tribal capitulation to the dominant legal system.

12. Kahn, A Place Called Home, supra note 3, at manuscript 7, 68, 81.
13. See, e.g., Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights: Litigation and Settlements, 42
TULSA L. REv. 23 (2006); Charles DuMars & Helen Ingram, CongressionalQuantification
ofIndian Reserved Water Rights: A Definitive Solution or a Mirage?, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J.
17 (1980); Daniel McCool, Intergovernmental Conflict and Indian Water Rights: An
Assessment of Negotiated Settlements, 23 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 85 (1993); Gina
McGovern, Settlement or Adjudication: Resolving Indian Reserved Rights, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
195 (1994).
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II. Indian NaturalResource Claims Resolution Options
Migration and the expansion of western urban areas have combined to
cause population levels in the American West to reach an unprecedented
high. This population boom has been accompanied by an increase in the
use of an already scarce commodity in the west - water,14 the "lifeblood"
of the west.' 5 Indeed, with irrigation accounting for over 90% of western
water consumption, the very health of the land and survival of people
hinges on an allocation of sufficient water rights.16
American Indians used water resources for centuries before the arrival of
European settlers." For example, the Zunis had fully functioning sedentary
communities that required reliable water sources:
Long before the Europeans dreamed that there could possibly be
another side to the world of which they believed themselves to
be the integral part, [the Zuni] had [ ] little cities of sun dried
brick and stone .

.

. inhabited by the descendants of those who

dwelt there before the New World was known to the Old.18
Any allocation of water resources therefore must include the water rights
of Indian nations. The federal government has long been stigmatized with a
reputation for giving Indians the short end of the stick,' 9 a reputation that is
likely to continue in the area of water rights despite the remarkable success
of the 101st Congress.
While the allocation of water rights is a state issue, the federal
government becomes involved in cases of Indian or intra-state rights. The
most important legal precedent for Indian water rights is Winters v. United
States.2 0 This case established that Indian nations were entitled to sufficient
water for irrigation and other purposes by necessary implication, even if
those rights were not spelled out in the treaties between the federal
14. Parfit, supranote 4, at 18-36; Kingsolver, supra note 4, at 36-59.
15. ERNEST A. ENGLEBERT & ANN FOLEY SCHEURING, WATER SCARCITY IMPACTS ON
WESTERN AGRICULTUREpassim (1984).

16. Ann E. Amundson, Recent JudicialDecisions Involving Indian Water Rights, in
INDIAN WATER 1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS 4 (Christine L. Miklas & Steven J. Shupe eds.,
1985) [hereinafter INDIAN WATER 1985].
17. WATER RIGHTS SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 49 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983) ("Irrigation of arid lands in the West began
before American settlement of the frontier. Indians were irrigating their lands when the
Spaniards first explored California.").
18. FRANK ROBERTS, THE ZUNI INDIANS 1 (1920-21).

19. Id n.2.
20. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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1
government and the Indian tribes. 2 As Indian nations have increased tribal
economic self-sufficiency and self-determination, tribal leaders and lawyers
have recognized the value of pressuring state and federal governments for
Winters rights. Indian water rights advocates characterize this process as
22
the transformation from "paper" water to actual "wet" water. Questions
remain, however, as to how best to convert such paper rights to actual use.
There are at least three options in pursuing a settlement of Indian water
rights claims. A Congressional Research Service report for Congress
elaborates on these choices:

What are the prospects for solution to the remaining claims? In
the first place, negotiated, out-of-court settlements between the
executive branch and the tribes (subject to approval by
Congress) are being explored .. . Second, congressional action,
Third, resolution
independent of negotiation, is possible.
the first two
should
through the courts remains as an alternative
23
avenues not be pursued to successful conclusion.
Congressional action based only on lobbying and without negotiation,
however, would all but exclude Indian representatives from the very
process of determining their own future. Negotiated settlement subject to
congressional approval is therefore one of the only resolution options short
of litigation.
The litigation option poses several problems. An Interior Department
representative has noted, "the increasingly apparent expense, delay,
uncertainty, and inadequacy of litigation have frustrated too many Indian
lt
,,24
These litigation problems in turn led to an increase in
water claimants.
congressional settlements. 25 On top of the cost and time-constraints that
litigation carries, the accumulation of past victories and mounting court
claims by eastern American Indian nations contributed to a backlash in the
courtroom against Indian interests after 1978.26 Thus, when Indian tribes
21. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 280 (2d ed. 1988).
22. INDIAN WATER 1985, supra note 16, at ix.
23. RICHARD S. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 87-227 GOV, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY: BACKGROUND, NATURE, HISTORY, CURRENT ISSUES, FUTURE TRENDS 59 (1987).
24. Frank K. Richardson, Interior'sView ofIndian Water Law, in INDIAN WATER 1985,

supra note 16, at 82.
25. Id. at 26 ("[A] contemporary interest in negotiation stems from several inherent
weaknesses in litigation which are proving problematic to all parties.

Litigation is time

consuming. Litigation is expensive.").
26. EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS 8889 (1989).
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started losing natural resources cases in the Supreme Court during the
1980s and 1990s, settlement became the most viable option.27
Eventually, both the Reagan and Bush administrations initiated a formal
United States policy of resolving American Indian water rights through
negotiation rather than litigation. The federal criteria for such a settlement
have included a finality to legal claims, federal cost that does not exceed the
potential of existing claims, federal cost that does not exceed the legal risk,
some degree of state and local cost sharing, obtaining a settlement that
promotes tribal economic self-sufficiency, and participation of the
Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs in the settlement.2 8
There are millions of American Indians in this country, separated into
approximately 400 distinct nations. Only a fraction of these nations have
witnessed any settlement of Winters rights, although there have been as
many as 100 legal cases pending simultaneously based on Winters rights.29
The pace of these settlements is slow and tedious, and there is an obvious
need to speed up the process. Former Chairman of the Navajo Nation,
Peter Zah, has summarized the Indian perspective:
[Federal] administration representatives come to Navajo Country
and talk about self-determination and "economic selfsufficiency." But those are just words to justify the decreased
federal spending on the Navajo Reservation. They will remain
just words, if we are denied the tools to develop our economy.
And water is clearly a necessary tool for that development.30
Disgust with a slow legal process has led many Indian nations to pursue
a congressionally ratified settlement rather than a complete Winters rights
allotment in the courts.
But legislative settlement efforts entail complications as well. Indian
representatives who have lobbied for water rights settlements find
themselves embroiled in a new competition for federal funds when they
attempt to broker a legislative settlement. Still, settlements of Indian water
rights through the legislative process once appeared to represent a positive
trend in the resolution of Indian water rights. Out of seven attempted
Indian water-related claims bills in the 101st Congress, for example, five
27. Interview with Steven M. Tullberg, Staff Attorney, Indian Law Resource Center
(Dec. 12, 1990) (on file with author).
28. Working Group in Indian Water Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223-01 (Mar. 12, 1990).
29. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
30. Peterson Zah, Water: Key to Tribal Economic Development, in INDIAN WATER 1985,
supra note 16, at 75-76.
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passed within the provisions of four separate bills.3 ' The legislative
settlement trend must be utilized to bring closure to Indian water rights
claims today.
III. Zuni Claims Settlement
Congress passed the Zuni Claims Settlement Act in October of 1990 and
President George Bush signed it as Public Law 101-486 on October 31,
1990. The legislation was prompted by ongoing and costly litigation
between the Zuni Indians of New Mexico and the federal government. In
1981, the Zunis filed a suit in the United States Claims Court against the
United States for its alleged failure to fulfill the requirements of the trust
relationship and protect Zuni resources. The dispute had been in litigation
for nearly ten years.32
A. History of the Claims
Although Zuni ancestors inhabited over fifteen million acres of land as
early as 5000 B.C., the Zuni land base eventually shrunk to an area of
408,000 acres in western New Mexico.33 In the meantime, the Zuni
population doubled from 1500 tribal members in 1879 to approximately
3000 by the end of the twentieth century.34 In 1598, Spain recognized the
existing Zuni province. When Mexico gained independence in 1821, the
new government continued to apply Spanish law to the Zunis and other
Indians.36 When the United States obtained New Mexico in 1848 under the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the newly acquired land included Zuni
aboriginal land holdings. But Zuni property rights remained valid under
Spanish and Mexican law, even after the United States acquired New
Mexico.38
31. See discussion infra Parts III-VIII.
32. S. REP. No. 101-306, at 2 (1990) (referring to consolidated claims, Ct. of Cl. No.
327-81L and 224-8L).
33. H.R. REP. No. 101-727, at 2-6 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-306, at 2 (1990).
34. TREATIES, LAND CESSIONS, AND OTHER U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS RELATIVE
To AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES: ZUNI INDIAN PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO 99 (George Emory Fay
compiler & ed., 1971) [hereinafter FAY]; DOROTHEA C. LEIGHTON & JOHN ADAIR, PEOPLE OF
THE MIDDLE PLACE 6 (1966).

35. H.R. REP. No. 101-727, at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. (referring to the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, Feb. 2,
1848, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, 9 Stat. 922, 929 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo])
38. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 250-52
(1984).
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During the late nineteenth century, however, the Attorney General of
New Mexico failed to recommend a confirmation of Zuni title to the U.S.
Congress.3 At the same time, the federal government was unable to
prevent settlers from destructive logging practices, water conversions,
adjacent overgrazing, destruction of ancient archaeological sites,
trespassing, or the illegal seizure of minerals, salt, and coal on Zuni land.4 0
These encroachments continued throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, causing soil erosion, the loss of vital natural resources, and
degradation of the Zuni agricultural base. Indeed, since the mid-1800s, the
Zunis have witnessed a staggering 90% loss in their productive land base.41
Part of the reason for this loss was a need for irrigation water, which is
scarce in the western United States. 42 Zuni irrigation has remained
relatively constant since the mid-1960s, when the tribe was irrigating 6300
acres out of a 400,000-acre land base.43 Without the ability to expand
irrigable acreage and have sufficient water, however, Zunis were without a
clear path to successful economic development.
B. ProposedLegislative Settlement
Both Senate Bill 2203 and House Bill 4143 extinguished pending U.S.
Claims Court cases by providing a monetary settlement without finding the
United States government liable." This legislation established a Zuni
Indian Resource Development Trust Fund with a sum of $25 million to be
invested by the Secretary of the Interior with no administrative deductions
or charges.4 5 In addition, Zunis and the Interior Department would develop
a comprehensive Zuni resource development plan that would include
programs for sustainable resources, watershed rehabilitation, land
acquisition, cooperative technical ventures with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and the funding and training of Zuni Indians to fill professional
implementation positions.4 6

39.
40.
4 1.
42.

See id; H.R. REP.No. 101-727.
S. REP. No. 101-306, at 2-3 (1990).
Id.
Parfit, supra note 4, at 18-36; Kingsolver, supra note 4, at 36-59.

43. LEIGHTON & ADAIR, supra note 34, at 5.

This amounted to 9182 acre-feet of

irrigated land. Id.
44. Zuni Claims Settlement Act of 1990, S. 2203, 101st Cong. (1990); Zuni Claims
Settlement Act of 1990, H.R. 4143, 101st Cong. (1990).
45. S. 2203;H.R. 4143.
46. S. 2203;H.R. 4143.
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Both the Senate and the House included limitations on the use of Zuni
settlement proceeds.47 Out of the $25 million trust fund allotment, the Zuni
could use a maximum of $8 million for the purchase, access maintenance,
defense of the "Zuni heaven" religious lands, the formulation of the Zuni
resource development plan up to $6 million annually for two years, and
attorney and legal costs for the Zuni U.S. Claims Court cases.48 Further, no
funds could be used to make direct per capita payments to Zuni tribal
members.4 9
Improved watersheds and a monetary settlement, which could be used to
acquire or enhance existing water rights, would be a valuable asset for the
Zuni Indian community.50 An 1879 Smithsonian Bureau of Ethnology
collecting party member, Frank Hamilton Cushing, documented the
importance of water to the Zuni nation, describing how "[t]he country of
the Zunis is so desert and dry, that . . . the possession of water for drinking
and cooking purposes alone, has been counted a blessing."' With the
federal goal of a stable reservation economy in mind, improved water rights
could provide not only sustenance for the Zuni nation but a leasable,
income-generating commodity as well.
C. ControversialIssues in Settlement Legislation
There were two major controversial issues regarding Senate Bill 2203
and House Bill 4143. The first involved the extent and validity of Zuni
compensation demands, and the second revolved around the retroactive
recognition of Zuni land title.
Zuni experts estimated the cost of the damages to their homeland and the
failure of the United States to protect Zuni Pueblo resources at a minimum
The proposed $25 million figure represented a
of $48 million.5 2
compromise to avoid tedious litigation for the ten-year old U.S. Claims

47. S. 2203; H.R. 4143.
48. The Act relating to "Zuni heaven" land passed on August 28, 1984. A Bill to
Convey Certain Land to the Zuni Indian Tribe for Religious Purposes, Pub. L. No. 98-408,
98 Stat. 1533 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 98.
49. S. REP. No. 101-306, at 3 (1990). Importantly, the Bills do not apply to or offset
any settlement of U.S. Claims Court No. 161-79L, but do retroactively recognize Zuni title
for the purpose of compensation to the 15 million acres of land that were included in the Cl.
Ct. 161-79L case. Id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. JESSE GREEN, ZUNI SELECTED WRITINGS OF FRANK HAMILTON CUSHING 5, 254
(1979).

52. S. REP. No. 101-306, at 3.
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Court cases. 3 Although Zuni experts conceded that climactic fluctuations
had an influence on the deterioration of the Zuni land base, the Zunis
maintained that an expanding population in the vicinity caused major

problems. 5 4
Zuni experts pointed to three instances of historical evidence to support
Zuni claims.55 After the United States obtained New Mexico, western
settlers engaged in destructive overgrazing near the Zuni reservation."
When the transcontinental railroad arrived across New Mexican lands, the
railroad removed vast amounts of timber without any regard to replanting
or other erosion preventive measures. 57 Finally, a series of failed dams on
the Zuni River - seven out of eight of which were federally constructed caused extensive damage by contributing to the erosion problem. 8 Thus,
overgrazing, timber removal, and dam construction combined with other
factors to cause deep channel incisions in the alluvial valleys of the Zuni
River drainage area, which included most of the Zuni reservation. Zuni
experts estimated damages figures as follows: 59
Land damages
Loss of water resources
Salt losses
Coal losses
Timber losses
Trespassing
Archaeological damage

$18,333,333.00
20,880,470.00
2,669,950.00
903,000.00
153,600.00
167,325.00
30,270,000.00

TOTAL

$73,377,678.00

Despite the Zuni expert's willingness to abandon the over $70 million
claim and settle for $25 million, the federal government steadfastly refused
to compromise and threatened pending Zuni legislation with a presidential
veto.

53. Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 101-727, at 6, 8 (1990).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 7-10. The archaeological damages figures reflected only 362 of 1824 possibly
damaged sites. The trespassing figure reflected approximately $500 in annual damages. Id.
at 10.
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The Zuni estimate of over a $20 million loss of water resources is
especially troubling considering the Zuni's needs and the geographical land
base. The Zunis use of land for elaborate floodwater irrigation systems and
waffle gardens along the banks of the Zuni River can be traced back over
centuries to agricultural techniques practiced by Zuni ancestors.60 Zuni
cultivation of corn expanded with the introduction of wheat, oats, and grain
by Franciscan missions from 1629 to 1682, who left written accounts of
Zuni women planting peach trees, onions, peppers, chili, beans, and squash
in the waffle gardens along the banks of the River.' In 1885, the Zuni area
Federal Indian Agent, Dolores Romero, reported that the tribe had been
using the same seeds for agricultural purposes for centuries.6262 Likewise,
Reverend Taylor F. Early's 1879 Annual Report of the Zuni Day School
contained documentation that the Zunis had been cultivating wheat and
corn for at least 200 to 300 years.63 An 1899 report of United States Indian
Agent N.S. Walpole even underscored the secret to agricultural activity on
Zuni lands, noting that, "[n]owhere can crops be raised without

irrigation." 64
The federal government presented a much different argument regarding
the issues covered in the U.S. Claims Court cases. In a statement to the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs representing the
administration's views, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General from the
Justice Department opposed both Senate Bill 2203 and House Bill 4143.6
The Deputy proclaimed that a Zuni settlement via congressional legislation
was unfair to other Indian tribes who had to litigate. 67 He emphasized that a
monetary settlement in the absence of court-imposed liability also set a
dangerous precedent, one "unwarranted" and "unfair" for future
negotiations between the federal government and Indian nations. 8 The
Deputy worried whether the Zuni claims justified damages, and maintained
that the Zuni claims were unwarranted because erosion damage began
occurring prior to U.S. involvement as part of "a naturally occurring type

60. T.J. FERGUSON & E. RICHARD HART, ZuNI ATLAS 37-38 (1985).
61. LEIGHTON & ADAIR, supra note 34, at 17-21, 23 (stating that Zuni were farmers
centuries before the arrival of the Spaniards).
62. FAY, supra note 34, at 126.
63. Id. at 104.
64. Id. at 205.
65. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 101-306, at 2-10 (1990).
66. S. REP. No. 101-306, at 7-10.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id.
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common in the Southwest." 69 He therefore concluded that the $25 million
settlement proposal was an arbitrary and burdensome gratuity for the
American taxpayers to bear.70
In a statement to the same committee, the Department of the Interior's
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs in Trust and Economic
Development also opposed Senate Bill 2203 and House Bill 4750.71 The
Interior Department representative opposed the bills because they
purportedly taxed limited federal resources at the expense of other Indian
tribes.72 The Interior Department felt that the existing Bureau of Indian
Affairs programs were sufficient for the Zuni, and that other grant programs
were available through departments such as Agriculture and Health and
Human Services.73
The views of both federal government representatives were echoed in the
minority viewpoint of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Views.74 The minority view on the Committee felt that Congress should
not preempt claims courts where historical and scientific expert evidence
was at issue, that the proposed legislation carried a substantial price tag,
that applying a different standard in negotiations with the Zuni than to the
other nineteen Pueblos would set a dangerous precedent, and that the
Department of Justice had made clear that the Department would
recommend President Bush's disapproval if the Bill passed.7 5
But based on the 1908 Winters case and precedent for liberal
interpretation of treaties in favor of American Indians, the Zunis had a
strong legal argument for senior water rights.76 In addition, a Zuni senior
water right would include the amount of water needed to irrigate their entire
acreage and not just areas of agricultural use.77

69. Id. at 9.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The minority constituents on the Committee were Reps. John J. Rhodes III (RAZ), Robert L Lagomarsino (R-CA), Don Young (R-AK), Larry E. Craig (R-ID), and
Barbara F. Vucanovich (R-NV). H.R. REP. No. 101-727, at 24-25 (1990).
75. Id.
76. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1908); Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
77. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 609-10, 641 (1983); Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 596-600 (1963).
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IV Fort McDowell Indian Community Water rights Settlement
On October 1, 1990, the House passed House Bill 5063, the Fort
McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act," which
included the text of House Bill 2570, the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act.79
The House passed the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act on February 28,
1990, and the Senate passed the Act on October 27, 1990.80 The President
signed the Act as Public Law 10 1-628 on November 28, 1990.81
The legislation was prompted by water claims litigation filed on behalf
of the Fort McDowell Indians, which threatened the water supply of over
1.5 million residents of the greater Phoenix metropolitan area.82 The Act
ratified a settlement agreement between the Fort McDowell Indians and
others that had been under negotiation for over five years, and the Secretary
of the Interior was designated to implement the Act.83 The interested
parties included the Fort McDowell Indian community, the State of
Arizona, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power
District, the Salt River Valley Water User's Association, the Roosevelt
Water Conservation District, the Arizona cities of Chandler, Glendale,
Mesa, Phoenix, Scottsdale, and Tempe, the Arizona town of Gilbert, and
the Central Arizona Water Conservation District.8 The settlement in the
bills completely satisfied and extinguished all current and potential claims
under federal and state laws regarding Fort McDowell Indians' water rights,
including ground, surface, and effluent water.
In 1978, Arizona initiated general stream adjudication in the Arizona
Supreme Court regarding water rights to the Gila River and its
tributaries - including the Verde River that runs through the Fort
78. Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, H.R.
5063, 101st Cong. (1990). Representative Udall (D-AZ) and Representative Rhodes (R-AZ)
co-sponsored House Bill 5063. Id. On July 25, 1990 Senator McCain (R-AZ) introduced
Senate Bill 2900, an identical bill, and placed House Bill 5063 on the calendar for the Senate
on October 2, 1990, where it died in adjournment. See H.R. REP. No. 10 1-727, at 20.
79. Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, H.R. 2570, 101st Cong., Pub. L. No. 101628, 104 Stat. 4469 (1990).
80. H.R. 2570, 101st Cong., 136 CONG. REC. D1436-02 (1990).
81. Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469
(1990).
82. Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, S. 2900,
101st Cong., at 26-27 (1990).
83. Id. § 2(b).
84. Id. § 3(a).
85. Id. The Act did not permit any future suits other than those that dealt with
enforcement or authorization of the Act itself. Id. § 9(a).
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McDowell reservation. 86 At the same time, there was a parallel federal
court suit underway attempting to determine quantification for the
distribution of associated federally reserved water rights.87 The Supreme
Court eventually deferred this decision to the state courts.
By 1985, the federal government and the Fort McDowell Indian
community still differed widely on any appropriate allocation and/or
compensation.8 9 Yavapai Indian Doctor Carlos Montezuma warned as
early as the 1930s of the prospect that Fort McDowell and other Yavapai
Indians would resent settlers for cheating Indians of their natural resource
birthrights, warning that "[m]aybe you have intoxicated us to sleep ... and
Rip Van Winkle like, we came back after many years and see the real as
though after a dream."90 The prospect of costly and lengthy litigation led to
five years of negotiation and the eventual Fort McDowell legislative
settlement.
A. History of the Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Claim
The aboriginal territory of the Yavapai Indians covered most of central
Arizona, including the present Fort McDowell reservation. 9'
The
Northeastern Yavapai in the Prescott region surrounding Fort McDowell
were known as the "Wikutepa." 92
As pressure mounted from non-Indian settlers, the Department of the
Army ("DOA") moved the Yavapai in 1873 to a military post near Camp
Verde and encouraged them to farm.93 The Yavapai had a history of water
usage and farming, and the Southeastern Yavapai had cultivated pink
maize, pumpkins, watermelons, and gourds. 94 The Yavapai dug a five-mile
irrigation ditch by hand, only to be moved in 1875 by the DOA to the San
Carlos Reservation near the Gila River in eastern Arizona. The Yavapai
wanted to move back near the Verde River to an abandoned military post

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. § 2(a)(6); see also S. 2900; S. REP. No. 101-479, at 6 (1990).
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 549 (1983).
Id. at 570.
S. REP. No. 101-479, at 6 (1990).

90. PETER IVERSON, CARLOS MONTEZUMA AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF AMERICAN
INDIANS 39 (1982).
91. E.W. Gifford, The Southeastern Yavapai, in 29 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLICATIONS IN AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY 177 (1932).

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
S.REP.No. 101-479, at 1.
Gifford, supra note 91, at 214.
S. REP. No. 101-479, at 1-2.
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called Fort McDowell, and petitioned President Theodore Roosevelt in
1903 to create a Fort McDowell Indian Reservation there.
On September 15, 1903, Roosevelt signed an Executive Order setting
aside non-settled land at Fort McDowell for the Yavapai Indians, and
Congress later appropriated $50 million for the purchase of non-Indian
claims.97 This purchase process concluded by 1905, and resulted in the
24,680 acre Fort McDowell reservation stretching two miles to the east and
west across the Verde River for a span of ten miles in a location only
98
twenty-three miles northeast of Phoenix.
Once relocated to Fort McDowell, the Yavapai needed permanent
irrigation and found support from the Chairman of the House Committee on
99 But the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Representative John H. Stephens.
Indian Affairs ("BIA") refused to support the request because it wanted to
move the Fort McDowell Yavapai to the 1400 acre Salt River Reservation,
even though the Yavapai would have to share the Reservation with their
0 0 After twenty years of
"deadly enemies," the Salt River Pima Indians.
stalling on irrigation assistance, the BIA attempted to force the Yavapai to
move to Salt River but aborted the effort when a state court would not
transfer Fort McDowell water rights.101 In the meantime, nothing was
accomplished in terms of agricultural systems for the Yavapai as the federal
government was distracted by a plan of forced exodus instead.
A 1935 Department of the Interior report found that out of $20,000 the
BIA earmarked for work on the Fort McDowell reservation, the federal
02
government diverted $15,000 to the Salt River Reservation.1 Further, the
federal government only spent $7000 on development programs at Fort
03
For
McDowell in the thirty years after formation of the Reservation.1
decades, the BIA Salt River relocation plan for the Yavapai thus provided a
rationale for neglectful federal assistance in developing permanent
irrigation systems at Fort McDowell.

96. Id. at 2.
97. Id.
9 8. Id.
99. Id. at 3.
100. IVERSON, supra note 90, at 121. "If, in the end, the Yavapai were to be removed,
their money spent on new irrigation works would be dollars wasted until the money was
invested, farming would continue to decline and land would continue to be unproductive."
Id. at 125-26.
101. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 3.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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Future federal plans for dam construction and land use in Fort McDowell
territory suggest the reasons underpinning federal efforts to remove the Fort
McDowell Indian community.'"0 In 1903, non-Indian landowners in the
Salt River valley organized a Salt River Water User's Association
("SRWUA") and contracted with the Salt River Pimas and the federal
government to build Roosevelt Dam under the Reclamation Act of 1902.0
The 1904 contract for repayment noted that only members of the SRWUA
would receive water from the project.'06 This led to a lawsuit over Yavapai
water rights in 1905.107
The United States Attorney representing the Fort McDowell Yavapai
ignored the 1908 Winters decision granting reservation water rights by
necessary implication, and included in his presentation warning of
imminent BIA plans to relocate the Yavapai to Salt River. 08 Judge Edward
Kent temporarily awarded the Fort McDowell Yavapai only 7060 acre-feet
of flow water needed to irrigate land already used for agriculture - a mere
1300 acres.' 09 This "Kent Decree" resulted in an artificially low water
allotment for the 24,680 acre Fort McDowell Reservation.'10
In 1935, the federal government agreed to build Bartlett Dam upstream
from Fort McDowell on the Verde River."' A 1936 Interior Department
Division of Investigative Affairs report noted that the prior Salt River
Project had failed to deliver the Fort McDowell "Kent Decree" water.1 12
Western Yavapai were cultivating pumpkins, beans, maize, watermelon,
tobacco, fruits, and medicinal plants in 1936, but the southeastern Yavapai
at Fort McDowell did not have the irrigation rights necessary to continue or
expand their farming."' The federal government subsequently built both
Bartlett and later Horseshoe Dams.114 The Bartlett Dam agreement allotted
104. MARTHA C. KNACK & OMER C. STEWART, As LONG As THE RIVER SHALL RuN: AN
ETHNOLOGY OF THE PYRAMID LAKE INDIAN RESERVATION 163 (1984)("[T]he presence of
resources, and the rights to exploit them, have never been separate from an advocacy of
abandonment of reservation lands in the West.").
105. S. REP.No. 101-479, at 3.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. CompareWinters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908), with S. REP. No. 101479, at 4.
109. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Gifford, supra note 91, at 263.
114. S.REP.No. 101-479, at 5.
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20% of its water storage to the Salt River Reservation, but none to the Fort
McDowell Reservation.'
In 1968 the Colorado River Basin Project Act passed - including a
proposal for Orme Dam at the Salt and Verde Rivers' confluence as an
6
integral element of the Central Arizona Project ("CAP")." Section 302 of
the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to condemn 15,900 Fort
7
McDowell Yavapai Reservation acres for the Dam's reservoir." Planning
for the Orme Dam continued until 1977, when President Jimmy Carter
recommended cancellation of the project and prompted a congressional
search for an alternative site that lasted a decade."' 8 But from 1968 to 1977,
all Fort McDowell development plans were omitted from federal assistance
programs due to pending plans for the Orme Dam." 9
B. Relationship to House Bill 4148 - HarquahalaValley
Senate Bill 2900 and House Bill 5063, as amended, were the result of
House Bill 4148, the Harquahala Valley legislation. House Bill 4148
instructed the Secretary of the Interior to contract for the permanent
relinquishment of the Harquahala Valley Irrigation District ("HVID") CAP
agricultural water.120 The Secretary could utilize the HVID or any other
source of federal water for a Fort McDowell settlement.121 The Secretary
was supposed to use the water first for the settlement of Fort McDowell
Indian community water claims, and then for other Indian communities
with claims to the Salt or Verde Rivers. The Secretary could use any
excess water to settle Gila River water rights claims of other Indian
In turn, the Secretary would reduce HVID's CAP
communities.122
23
obligations.1 The federal government did not have to appropriate any
additional funds under the HVID option, but the Congressional Budget

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. H.R. 4148, 101st Cong. § 1 (1990).
121. Id. The Secretary could use up to a maximum of 33,263 acre-feet of HVID water as
either agricultural CAP water or CAP Indian priority water. Id. § 1(a).
122. Id. § 1(b).
123. Id. § 1(c)(ii).
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Office ("CBO") estimated a $26 million federal loss in contractual CAP

revenue. 12 4
Farmers first drilled for irrigation wells in the Harquahala Valley eighty
miles west of Phoenix in 1958.125 Eventually, increased water costs,
accumulated debt, and market conditions for the Districts' principal crop of
cotton combined to threaten the fiscal health of area farmers.12 6 The loans
and contracts that the District had with the federal government were in
danger of default.12 7 Many of the farms had been foreclosed, or faced
foreclosure if the legislation did not pass.128 Indeed, all but one of the
landowners placed their lands in escrow in anticipation of retiring or
moving their farming operations.12 9 Senate Bill 2900 and House Bill 5063
as amended relieved the farmers of their overwhelming debt and provided a
land and water source for federal negotiations with Indian communities like

Fort McDowell.130
C. ProposedLegislative Settlement
House Bill 5063 and Senate Bill 2900 served to quantify the Fort
McDowell Indian community's water rights at approximately 36,350 acrefeet annually, including Salt River Project and Roosevelt Water
Conservation District water and storage contributions (6730 and 3368 acrefeet respectively), existing Fort McDowell CAP water (4526 acre-feet), and
water awarded in the 1910 "Kent Decree" (7060 acre-feet).' 3 ' This annual
water allotment was large enough to irrigate 4000 acres for agricultural
purposes and develop 18,350 acres for urban and other uses.132 Storage
areas provided by the Salt River Project on the Verde River behind

124. An Act to Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Acquire Certain Water Rights
for the Settlement of Indian Water Rights Claims in the State of Arizona, H.R. 4148, 101st
Cong. (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-496, at 5 (1990).
125. H.R. REP.No. 101-496, at 5.
126. Id.
127. 136 CoNG. REC. H3363 (daily ed. June 6, 1990).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. H.R. REP. No. 101-496, at 5.
131. Id.; see also Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat.
885, tit. III (1968) (CAP water); Hurley v. Abbot, No. 4564 Decree (3d Dist., Maricopa
County, Ariz., Mar. 1, 1910) (defining "Kent Decree" water); 43 U.S.C. § 931 (2006) (Water
Conservation District water/storage).
132. S. REP.No. 101-479, at 7 (1990).
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Horseshoe and Bartlett Dams would have allowed the Fort McDowell
Indian community to fully utilize those water rights.
The settlement also included a requirement that neighboring non-Indian
communities transfer rights to an additional 13,933 acre-feet of surface
water to the Fort McDowell Indian community, provide means for
maintaining existing Indian supplies, and make substantial financial
34
contributions to a development fund.1 The federal government was to
help implement and finance the settlement. 3 1 In particular, the Secretary of
the Interior would contractually acquire water for the Fort McDowell Indian
community from one or a combination of the following sources: municipal,
industrial, or Indian priority CAP water permanently relinquished by the
HVID, the City of Prescott, the Yavapai-Prescott Tribe, the YavapaiApache Indian community of Camp Verde Reservation, the Cottonwood
Water Company, or the Camp Verde Water Company (also known as the
"Prescott Option").136 The Fort McDowell Indian community could also
lease any of the CAP water for 100 years to Pima, Final, or Maricopa
Counties in Arizona.' 37 Otherwise, the Fort McDowell could not sell, lease,
38
or transfer any allotted CAP water off the reservation.
The proposed settlement foreshadowed future legislative settlements of
Indian natural resource claims.' 3 9 Any extra water acquired would be used
for other Indian claims settlements in the Salt and Verde River systemS.140
In addition, the Secretary was required to complete a study within 180 days
after the Act's enactment regarding possible water rights settlements for the

133. Id.
134. Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, S. 2900,
101st Cong., § 6(a).
135. Id.
136. Id. The options included any other water resource at the disposal of the United
States government. Id. As long as 7000 acre-feet of the CAP water was from sources other
than HVID, the Secretary could purchase water rights from willing sellers in the Big Chino
Valley of the Verde River watershed to replace water rights given up by involved parties
under the "Prescott Option." Id. at 45. The "Prescott Option" could be exercised as long as
the collection, conveyance, diversion, and delivery system to nearby Sullivan Lake would
not adversely affect the flow of the Verde River or jeopardize threatened or endangered
species such as the Spikedace Fish. Id. A maximum of $30 million was allotted for the
"Prescott Option," including delivery costs and continual monitoring for environmental
effects. Id. at 41.
137. S. 2900 § 7(a)(2), (d); S. REP. No. 101-479, at 17.
138. S. 2900 § 7(g).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 6(a).
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nearby Yavapai-Prescott Indian tribe and the Yavapai-Apache Indian
community. 141
The proposed settlement also recognized the value of Fort McDowell
Indian water rights. The Act created a CAP delivery contract between the
federal government and the Fort McDowell Indian community regarding
4300 acre-feet of CAP Indian priority water.14 2 The Fort McDowell Indian
community would lease this water to the City of Phoenix during the
extension period in exchange for $5,172,000.143
Finally, the proposed settlement established a Fort McDowell Indian
Community Development Fund that would include future water lease
revenues, a $2 million contribution from the State of Arizona, $23 million
for the design and implementation of water facilities and other economic
and community development, and a $13 million federal loan with no
interest under the provisions of the Small Reclamation Projects Act.'" The
balance of the loan could fall below $1 million, and the Fort McDowell
Indian community would administer the fund, not the Secretary of the

Interior.145

D. ControversialIssues in Settlement Legislation
When introducing Senate Bill 2900 on July 25, 1990, Senator McCain
outlined several controversial issues in the original Bill and its counterpart,
House Bill 5063.146 The first controversial issue regarded the validity of
Fort McDowell Yavapai water claims and the appropriate amount of any
federal contribution to the settlement effort. The second issue concerned a
proposal to use excess water from the 1984 settlement of Ak Chin Indian
water rights to supplement the Fort McDowell settlement. Additional
controversies included the environmental effects that water diversion would
have if such action was necessary to settle Fort McDowell water rights
claims, the feasibility of a proposed "Prescott Option," and federal
validation of implicated water storage rights.14 7

141. Id.; S. REP. No. 101-479, at 16.
142. S. 2900 § 6(a).
143. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 16.
144. S.2900 §8.
145. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 16. The Bills were also tied to provisions of the Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100512, 102 Stat. 2549 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 102.
146. 136 CONG. REc. S10633 (daily ed. July 26, 1990).
147. Id.
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By the 1980s, the Fort McDowell Yavapai needed money. In 1989, the
total revenue for the Fort McDowell Indian community totaled just under
$2.5 million.148 Out of this income, 33% came from BIA funding and the
town bingo hall generated the other 40%.149
The tribal leaders of Fort McDowell thus began a process of maximizing
natural resource rights for economic stability. Still, a reliable and sufficient
water supply was needed to continue the plans. Once the Yavapai secured
Fort McDowell water rights, tribal leaders envisioned land usage and
allotment at Fort McDowell as follows:

Agriculture
Community development
Industrial use
Residential areas
Recreational and resort areas
Open space wilderness

ACRES
4,100
419
454
2,174
3,233
14,684

TOTAL

25,064

150

Without an adequate settlement of water rights, however, the Fort
McDowell Indian community would be unable to sustain a viable
151
reservation economy.
During claims litigation in 1985, the Fort McDowell Indian community
15 2
In
maintained that its water allotment totaled 48,000 acre-feet annually.
negotiations with local surrounding governments, the Fort McDowell
maintained that this water claim could total 53,000 acre-feet annually
3
absent a legislative settlement. 5
Although the federal cost could not be pinpointed until the Secretary of
the Interior decided which of the options he would exercise in obtaining the
necessary 13,933 acre-feet of surrounding water rights, the approximate
proposed ratio of local and federal cost sharing was 50/50. The Fort

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

S. REP. No. 101-479, at 5-6.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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McDowell Indian community estimated the federal contribution at $23

million.15 4

Local parties weighed in during the legislative process on the
controversial issues of federal contribution and the scope of Fort McDowell
Indian water rights. The Director of the Arizona Department of Water
Resources testified at the Joint Hearing on July 17, 1990, and reiterated that
the State of Arizona supported negotiation rather than litigation in settling
Indian water rights claims.155 He told the Committees that the Governor of
Arizona would support an appropriation of $2 million to serve as the State's
contribution to the Fort McDowell Indian community development trust
fund. 56
The City of Phoenix also submitted testimony, claiming a "close
working relationship on water" with the Fort McDowell Indian community.
157
Back in 1922, the two governments completed an agreement that
allowed the City to develop an infiltration gallery on the Verde River with a
thirty-mile redwood pipeline stretching back to Phoenix.'58 However,
recent disputes over the allocation of surface water led Phoenix officials to
support a legislative settlement instead of lengthy and expensive
litigation.'" 9
Phoenix officials felt the federal contribution to the settlement should be
the acquisition of rights to 13,933 annual acre-feet of water, a $23 million
contribution to the Fort McDowell Indian community development trust
fund, and a $13 million loan.160 The City of Phoenix's estimates included a
state contribution of the rights to approximately 12,000 acre-feet of annual
water as well as city lease payments on the 4300 acre-feet of Fort

154. 136 CONG. REc. S10633, at 54. This excepted the cost of no-interest loan. The nointerest terms of the $13 million federal loan were because the federal government otherwise
would have been required to spend approximately $7 million on CAP water delivery systems
to the Reservation in the absence of a legislative settlement. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 17.
155. Fort McDowell Indian Comm. Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990: Joint Hearing
on H.R. 5063 Before House Comm. on Insular Affairs & Sen. Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 101st Cong. 172 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of N.W. Plummer, Ariz.
Dep't of Water Res.). The Department spent over two million dollars a year at the time on
technical studies for the adjudications of water-claims suits. Id.
156. Id. at 156. Plummer could not speak for the Arizona legislature. Id.
157. Id. at 172 (statement of Phoenix, AZ city officials).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 172-75.
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61
McDowell Indian Community Colorado River CAP water entitlement.1
Despite the enormous fiscal implications, the City Council of Phoenix
passed a resolution with the support of the Phoenix Mayor on July 11,
1990, affirming unanimous support for the legislation and knighting Senate
Bill 2900 and House Bill 5063 as emergency measures given water

shortages.

162

The federal government opposed both Senate Bill 2900 and House Bill
5063, however. According to the House Report, there was an official
congressional and administrative policy to resolve Indian water rights
claims by negotiation rather than litigation whenever possible.1 6 3 Despite
this policy, the Administration had serious reservations about the bills that
threatened adoption into law. Director of the CBO, Robert D. Reishauer,
estimated the necessary federal contribution as follows: an authorization of
$55.2 million from 1991 to 1995, actual distributions of $54.4 million from
1991 to 1995, and an additional $17.2 million to complete water
construction and acquisition activities from 1996 to 2000.' 6 This included
the cost of a $13 million loan, which would be paid back over a fifty-year
period with no interest.' 65 The tentative CBO federal contribution estimate
therefore was approximately $71 million.166 In addition, the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") opined in conclusory fashion that the
bills "would not be in accord with the program of the President."l67
On September 20, 1990, Interior Secretary Lujan sent a letter to the
House and Senate Committees that recommended presidential veto of either
bill.168 The Department of the Interior felt that the legislation could harm
other Indian water claims and that the federal contribution of approximately
161. Id. at 176. Phoenix officials estimated that if the local contribution of 12,000 annual
acre-feet of water came from remote farm lands purchased by Phoenix, Mesa, or Scottsdale,
the cost would be $3000-$4000 per acre-foot. Id. at 175. If the water source was from the
reclamation of municipal sewage waste-water, the cost would be $5000-$6000 per acre-foot.
Id. at 176. These estimates included the cost of purifying CAP or groundwater supplies to
the higher quality level found in the Verde River that runs through Fort McDowell. Id. This
range combined with the Phoenix lease payments of $5,200,000 and the State trust fund
contribution of $2 million to lead Phoenix officials to estimate the net local settlement
contribution to total at least $43 million. Id.
162. Id.
163. Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, H.R.
5063, 101st Cong. (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-778, at 1(1990).
164. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 28 (1990).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 34.
168. Id. at 31-33.
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$70 million was disproportionate and unfair to taxpayers.' 69 Further, the
Department of the Interior worried that, without a finalized agreement,
objectionable provisions or unknown costs could emerge during
implementation.170 The Department of the Interior believed that water
rights issues should be decided in court.' 7 If legislation served to grant
rather than confirm a federal water right, the Department of the Interior also
worried about confrontations with other interested parties.172 These
concerns prompted certain members of the Committee to recommend
executive disapproval of Senate Bill 2900 and House Bill 5063.173
The second controversial legislative issue concerned a proposal to use
excess water from the 1984 legislative settlement of Ak Chin Indian water
claims to supplement the Fort McDowell settlement. 7 4 Both amended bills
eliminated this clause from the final legislation because uneasiness with the
"Ak Chin surplus" clause attributed to fears that one Indian claims
settlement could adversely affect another.'75 The Fort McDowell Indian
community had no official position on the "Ak Chin surplus" clause. One
can surmise that the priority of the Fort McDowell Indian community was
to secure their annual water rights, rather than resolving sourcing questions
for those rights.
In any case, widespread disapproval of the "Ak Chin surplus" surfaced at
the July 17, 1990 Joint Hearing. The Arizona Department of Water
Resources opposed the use of "the so-called surplus Ak-Chin Indian
community water" as a supply source.176 The City of Prescott also testified
that the Ak Chin option was fraught with difficulty.' 77 Additional negative
testimony came from municipal and agricultural entities in Maricopa and
Pinal counties and the San Carlos Apache tribe.' 7 8 Finally, a Department of

169. Id.
170. Id. at 30-31.
171. Id. at 31.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 30.
174. See e.g., An Act Relating to the Water Rights of the Ak-Chin Indian Community,
Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 98.
175. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 34. Remarkably, the record does not reflect that the Ak
Chin themselves were even officially consulted regarding this supposed "surplus."
176. Hearings,supra note 155, at 42 (statement of Timothy W. Glidden, Counselor to the
Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior).
177. Id. at 225 (statement of Robert C. Morgan, Mayor, Prescott, Ariz.).
178. S. REP.No. 101-479, at 13.
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the Interior representative testified that the Ak Chin option was unreliable
and would require other legislative amendments.1 7 9
The proposed Fort McDowell Yavapai legislative settlement also had to
account for environmental concerns related to involved water diversions.
The Fort McDowell Yavapai and the surrounding parties to the settlement
recognized the need to comply with all existing law and national
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") guidelines in completing the
settlement terms. For example, both amended bills contained language that
prohibited the pumping of groundwater without complete compliance with
environmental and endangered species laws. 80
Ninety-five percent of Arizona's riparian habitat had been lost since
1900, with most of the remaining 5% surrounding parts of the Verde
River.18 ' This riparian habitat included endangered bald eagles, the
proposed endangered razorback sucker, endangered Colorado squawfish,
and the back minnow.182 The State of Arizona had listed nine other species
The
that lived within the riparian habitat as endangered or threatened.'
Department of the Interior felt that environmental concerns along the Verde
River needed more attention.1'8 Congress eventually included provisions to
this effect in both amended committee versions of Senate Bill 2900 and
House Bill 5063.

The proposed "Prescott Option" was also a controversial aspect of the
legislative claims settlement debate for the Fort McDowell Yavapai. The
"Prescott Option" envisioned a situation in which several Arizona
communities relinquished rights to CAP water if unable to fully utilize it
due to geographic placement to the more strategically placed Fort
McDowell reservation in exchange for federal assistance in locating
replacement water in the nearby Big Chino Valley. 86 The Mayor of
Prescott testified at the July 17, 1990 joint hearing that if no change to
existing law and CAP distributions occurred, the City of Prescott would
have no more accessible water after 2005.187
179. Hearings,supra note 155, at 47 (statement of Counselor Glidden).
180. S. REP. NO. 101-479, at 22.
181. Id. at 14.
182. Id. at 15
183. Id
184. Hearings,supra note 155, at 48 (statement of Counselor Glidden).
185. S. REP. No. 101-479, 33.
186. Hearings,supra note 155, at 225 (statement of Mayor Morgan)
187. Id. The Mayor of Prescott devoted a great deal of his testimony to the "Prescott
Option" at the July 17, 1990, joint hearing. Id. The Mayor therefore emphasized the City's
desire to contribute over $20 million to the cost of the "Prescott Option," noting that such a
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The Mayor of Prescott elaborated on the "Prescott Option" with a
detailed plan.' 88 The City of Prescott had already spent $500,000 on
exploratory studies in the Big Chino Valley.189 The City could purchase
water rights and land of the Davis Ranch estate in the Big Chino Valley for
$15 million.' 90 The necessary federal contribution would be to construct
wells and pipelines to stretch seventeen miles from Davis Ranch to Sullivan
Lake at the head of the Verde River. Cottonwood Water Company, Camp
Verde Water Company, and the Camp Verde Yavapai-Apache Tribe would
construct EPA approved pipelines from Sullivan Lake to their lower Verde
Valley destinations.' 9' Finally, the City of Prescott would build its own
delivery system.' 92 The Mayor of Prescott testified, complete with tentative
schedules, work proposals for continued hydro-geologic investigations in
the Big Chino valley, and a cost breakdown. 193 This "Prescott Option"
could have served as the foundation to settle the water rights claims of the
Prescott Yavapai and Camp Verde Yavapai-Apache Indian communities as
well.'94 But the Mayor's dream for a "Prescott option" required an
additional $30 million to the proposed federal price tag for the Fort
McDowell settlement. 9 5
In the Administration's opposition to the bills, an Interior Department
representative testified that the Prescott Option would be too expensive.1 96
contribution would also eliminate the question of any illegal selling of CAP water. Id. By
exercising the Prescott Option, the federal government could avoid the environmental
concerns entailed in diverting CAP water (the Harquahala option) or the outrage which
would be generated by the hundreds of entities wanting additional CAP water if a simple
reallocation occurred (the Ak Chin option). Id. at 232.
188. The Mayor envisioned local water contributions totaling 12,059 acre-feet as follows:
City of Prescot (7127 acre-fee); Prescott Yavapai Indians (500 acre-feet); Cottonwood Water
Company (1789 acre-feet); Camp Verde Water Company (1443 acre-feet); and, Camp Verde
Yavapai-Apache Tribe (1,200 acre-feet).
189. Id. at 234.
190. Id. at 225, 234.
191. Id.
192. Hearings,supra note 155, at 227 (statement of City of Prescott Mayor) (description
of 'Prescott Option' as Source of Additional Water for Fort McDowell Indian Community
Settlement).
193. Id. at 5. The Mayor provided a cost breakdown totaling $55,400,000 consisting of a
contribution from the City of Prescott in the amount of $20,800,000; contributions from
Lower Verde Valley communities of $4,600,000; and, federal government contributions of
$30,000,000.
194. Id.
195. Interview with Eric Eberhardt, Staff Director/Council to Minority Members, Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs (Oct. 19, 1990).
196. See Hearings,supra note 155, at 47-48 (statement of Counselor Glidden).
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The $5000 cost per acre-foot of Prescott Option water would "limit the
amount of water" that could be obtained from the source. 19 7
Finally, the proposed Fort McDowell Yavapai legislative claims
settlement had to address water storage rights.198 The confirmation and
creation of reliable storage rights for Kent Decree water would allow the
Fort McDowell Indian community to take full advantage of their seasonal
water rights in times of high demand and drought.' 99
The Administration, however, opposed the confirmation of water rights
that could impact property interests of parties not involved in the
settlement.200 In addition, the federal government opposed congressional
validation of storage rights on the Verde River in compliance with a longstanding federal policy allowing state courts to adjudicate water rights.2 0 1
Congress therefore included language specifying that the legislation did not
apply to existing contracts of parties who were not included in the

197. Id.

198. Section 4 of both Senate Bill 2900 and House Bill 5063 served to ratify existing
Verde River water storage agreements. Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1990, S. 2900, 101st Cong. (1990). In addition, section 4 authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to contract for up to 3200 additional acre-feet of water storage rights
behind Bartlett and Horseshoe Dams. Such a contract would allow the Fort McDowell
Indian community to take advantage of their entire "Kent Decree" water rights allotment. Id.
Without this storage right, over one quarter of the Kent Decree water would travel
downstream unused in periods of low demand such as the winter months. S. REP. No. 101479, at 10 (1990).
199. Subsection 4 was necessary to confirm the validity of existing Verde River water
storage rights claims on Bartlett and Horseshoe Dams, so the federal government could meet
water rights and storage obligations to both the Fort McDowell Yavapai Indians and the Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian community. Hearings, supra note 155, at 184 (statement of
Richard H. Silverman); see also Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-512, 102 Stat. 2549 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 102.
200. S. REP. No. 101-479, at 31.
This
201. Hearings, supra note 155, at 42 (testimony of Counselor Glidden.
congressional consent to suit (as trustees of Indian nations) in state courts over matters of
water adjudication is based on the provisions of the McCarran Amendment of 1952. 43
U.S.C. § 471 (2006); see also Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976) (upholding McCarran Amendment); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache
Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983) (same).
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settlement.2 02 With these and other changes, Congress eventually passed
the proposed legislation as part of the Arizona Desert Wilderness Act.203
V. Fort HallIndian Water Rights Settlement
The 101st Congress also passed Indian water rights settlement legislation
involving the Fort Hall Indian Tribe. The House of Representatives
considered House Bill 5308, the Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Settlement
Act of 1990, and the Senate counterpart was Senate Bill 2870.20 Congress
passed the Act in October of 1990 and the President signed it on November
16, 1990, as Public Law 101-602.205
The Fort Hall legislation was prompted by a series of long and costly
legal battles between state and tribal interests over water rights claims.206
In 1985, the Idaho legislature called for the Idaho Department of Water
Resources to develop a plan for the general adjudication of water rights
within the Snake River Basin - including a mandate favoring settlement of
tribal water rights through negotiation rather than litigation.207 On August
30, 1985, the Shoshone-Bannock tribe and the State of Idaho created a
Memorandum of Understanding that described negotiation guidelines.20 8
The federal government eventually joined the negotiation, and the
interested parties reached an agreement in principle on September 1,
1989.209 The interested parties reached a final agreement on all material
terms on July 10, 1990 that satisfied federal, state, and tribal interests.210
This agreement served as the basis for the language included in the Act.211
202. S. REP.No. 101-479, at 31-33.
203. Senator McCain introduced the Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1990, S. 2900, 10 1st Cong., on July 25, 1990, which was an identical bill.
The Bill was on the Senate calendar by October 2, 1990, but it died in adjournment. Id.
204. Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, S. 2870, 101st Cong., Pub. L. No. 101602 (1990).
205. Senate Bill 2870 was sponsored and introduced by Senator McClure (R-ID) and
Senator Symms (R-ID). Congress incorporated the outstanding terms of Senate Bill 2870
into the unsuccessful Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1989, H.R.
2567, 101st Cong. (1989).
206. H.R. REP. No. 101-336, 101st Cong., at 2 (1990).
207. Id.
208. Id. The guidelines were negotiations that were government-to-government in goodfaith, and recognized a decision-sharing relationship. Id.
209. Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 5308, 101st Cong., §§ 3-4 (as
passed by House & Senate Jan. 23, 1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-831, at 2 (1990).
210. H.R.REP.No. 101-831, at 2.
211. Id. at 3.
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The Fort Hall Water Claims Settlement Act of 1990 therefore served as a
model for future Indian water claims settlements.2 12 Five years of
negotiation led to an acceptable agreement and helped avoid the torturous
litigation option. In addition, the Executive Branch was involved in the
settlement discussions and thus endorsed the final agreement.2 13 Federal
involvement in the process served to eliminate opposition and the ensuing
controversies that often doom the fate of Indian water claims settlement
legislation.
A. History of the Claims
President Andrew Johnson issued an Executive Order in 1867, creating
the Fort Hall Reservation for the Shoshone and Bannock tribeS214 near
Pocatello, in southeastern Idaho.215 On February 24, 1869, the Senate
ratified the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger and recognized the ShoshoneBannock Tribe's permanent home on a Fort Hall Reservation of
approximately 1.8 million acres.216 Surveying errors and later federal land
cessions reduced the Reservation to its current size of approximately
544,000 acres.217 The Shoshone-Bannock tribe numbered 1450 strong in
218
The tribe owns 47% of
1900, and has more than doubled in size since.
the reservation land and individual American Indians own 43%.219 Water
rights are vital to ensuring economic self-sufficiency on the Reservation, as
the Shoshone-Bannock use water for irrigation, domestic, commercial,
municipal, industrial, hydropower, recreation, stock watering, fish
Instream flows help
reproduction, and instream flow purposes.220
trout, which have
steelhead
and
salmon
of
rejuvenate the population
cultural, dietary, commercial, and recreational importance to the ShoshoneBannock people.22 1

212. H.R. 5308; H.R. REP. No. 101-831, at 2.
213. Id. The federal government representatives included officials from the Office of
Management and Budget and the United States Departments of Interior and Justice. Id.
214. H.R. REP. NO. 101-831, at 2.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 9.
221. Id. at 7; accordInterview with Harry Sachse, Law Firm of Sonosky, Chambers, and
Sachse, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 2, 1990); see also S. REP. No. 101-499, at 1, 88 (1990).
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B. ProposedLegislative Settlement
Both House Bill 5308 and Senate Bill 2870 included waivers of all
existing or future Shoshone-Bannock water rights claims within the Upper
Snake River Basin as well as any land or water depreciation claims related
to the American Falls Reservoir.2 22 The Bills also quantified the Tribe's
Winters doctrine and other water rights at a total of 581,031 acre-feet
annually. 223 This water would consist of 150,000 annual acre-feet of
Blackfoot River flow, 115,000 annual acre-feet of Snake River flow, as
well as smaller allotments from Sand Creek, Ross Fork Creek, Lincoln
Creek, Bannock Creek, Portneut River, and groundwater found within the
boundaries of the Fort Hall Reservation.22 4 Existing tribal water storagerights in American Falls Reservoir (46,931 acre feet annually (2.81 % of
capacity)) and Palisades Reservoir (83,900 acre-feet annually (7% of
capacity)) were retained in the Bill. 225 For times when the Tribe's water
rights entitlement was not met by the natural flow of the Blackfoot River,
supplemental water storage rights in Blackfoot Reservoir and Grays Lake
for 150,000 annual acre-feet were established.22 6
In addition, the bills included a $10 million economic development fund
for the Fort Hall Indians to be paid over three years.227 The amended House
Bill 5308 also provided $7 million in funding over three years for a
Reservation water management system.228 Finally, the bills appropriated $5
million for a land acquisition in the Grays Lake area for the Fort Hall Indian
Irrigation Project. 22 9 The bills barred the Tribe from distributing any of the
funds on a per-capita basis. 23 0

222. H.R. REP. No. 101-831, at 2-9. The Upper Snake River Basin consists of all the
Snake River waters and tributaries found above Hells Canyon Dam in Idaho. Id.
223. 136 CONG. REc. S9978 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
224. H.R. REP. No. 101-831, at 7. Fort Hall Indian Irrigation Project users would
continue to receive their water allotment despite the settlement. Id. at 3-4.
225. Id. at 7.
226. Id.
227. Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 5308, 101st Cong., at 8-9 (1990).
228. Id.
229. Id. The proposed land acquisition would help slow the erosion process on the
shores of Grays Lake, thus ensure continuing water storage possibilities in the Lake, provide
the Shoshone-Bannock tribe with additional grazing rights, and expand the Grays Lake
Wildlife Refuge to include a habitat suitable for migratory birds and whooping cranes. Id.
230. Id.
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C. ControversialIssues in Settlement Legislation
There were four major controversial issues surrounding the settlement.
The first issue regarded the procedural strategy of incorporating Senate
Bill 2870 into the House Bill 2567 reclamation legislation with the hope of
The second controversial issue
speeding up the approval process.
concerned storage rights uses, and the third revolved around water rights
deferments in times of low flow. The last controversial item hinged on the
cost distribution between federal, state and local parties.
First, the proposed Fort Hall legislative claims settlement had to be
reconciled with House Bill 2567, the Reclamation Projects Authorization
and Adjustment Act of 1990. The original House Bill 2567 consisted of
eleven water-related projects that dealt with technical water issues such as
authorization ceilings, service area extensions, reformulations, design,
construction, maintenance, treatment and salinity, waste reclamation plants,
23
storage and carrying capacity amendments, and an aqueduct renaming. '
Many of the projects were once the subject of individual bills, and Congress
had grouped these disparate projects together to simplify the legislative
process. A Senate Committee amendment included Indian water rights
232
settlements for the Fort Hall and Pyramid Lake reservations in the Bill.
Several of the projects included in the Reclamation Act had already passed
both the House and the Senate, so the addition of Fort Hall and Pyramid
Lake projects into House Bill 2567 was an attempt to integrate the passage
2 33
The
of Indian water claims settlements into a larger reclamation bill.
passed
only
and
Act
Senate never voted on the amended Reclamation
House Bill 5308 as amended.234
House Bill 5308 contained restrictions on the potential use of existing
Shoshone-Bannock storage-rights. 235 Any water within existing storage
rights could be used for instream flows for the purpose of maintaining the
fish population, 2 36 allowing the Shoshone-Bannock to protect and enhance
237
The Tribe also
native fish runs in the middle and lower Snake River.
in the
storage-rights
water
existing
of
acre-feet
could use the 130,831
231. H.R. 2567, 101st Cong., at 1-36 (1990).
232. Id. at 47, 87.
233. Id. at 48. House Bill 2567 tried to resolve Pyramid Lake water rights claims in
addition to Fort Hall claims, even though the Pyramid Lake matter was very controversial.
Id.; see also infra Part VI.
234. S. REP. No. 101-499, at ll(1990).
235. H.R. REP. No. 101-831, at 7 (1990).
236. Id.
237. Id.
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American Falls and Palisades reservoirs to irrigate up to 33,938 acres of
Fort Hall land.238 Any land that the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe wished to
irrigate beyond 33,938 acres was contingent on additional water use not
harming other non-Indian users.2 39 According to the language in House
Bill 5308, the Tribe could rent or lease existing tribal water storage rights
through the Shoshone-Bannock Water Bank to users outside of the
Reservation, 240 providing a financial boost to the Reservation's economy
and self-sufficiency.
The Bill also addressed supplemental water storage rights needs that
were the subject of some controversy. The Tribe could only use 15,000
acre-feet annually of the additional Blackfoot River Basin water storage
rights for instream flows. 24 ' This allowed the Shoshone-Bannock to
maintain fish populations beyond the Snake River, while capping the
instream flow to ensure the Tribe did not use water excessively in times of
low flow. 24 2
The Tribe could only transfer, lease, or rent these
supplemental water storage rights within the Reservation, where they were
not subject to state or federal taxation.24 3
The proposed Fort Hall legislative settlement also had to account for
appropriate water rights deferments during periods of low flow. Language
in House Bill 5308 provided that the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe's right to
150,000 annual acre-feet of Blackfoot River water would be replaced by
Blackfoot River Basin (Blackfoot Reservoir and Grays Lake) supplemental
water storage rights in times of low flow. 2 44 During these times, the Tribe
has agreed to give priority to its Blackfoot River water rights allotment to
non-Indian Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") users. 2 45 Depending

238. Id. at 7-8.
239. Id. This was to ensure that the Tribe was not excessively irrigating in drought times
when reservoir water was scarcer and non-Indian users need their full water storage-rights.
Id.
240. H.R. 5308, 101st Cong. (1990). The Tribe could only rent water coming from the
Palisades Reservoir to users within the Snake River Basin above Milner Dam, however. The
purpose of this provision was to address water shortage concerns amongst non-Indian users
in the Upper Snake River Basin. Id.
241. 136 CONG. REc. S9978 (daily ed. July 18, 1990) (any such flows had to be used
within the reaches of the Blackfoot River).
242. Id. These supplemental water storage rights could be used only when the Tribe's
entitlement was not met by natural Blackfoot River flows. Id.
243. Id.
244. 136 CONG. REc. at S9979.
245. Id. Any extra water rights from the Bannock Creek Basin general adjudication
would flow to the Tribe as well, unless that interfered with SRBA uses. Id.
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on the Tribe's use of its Snake River water rights allotment, non-Indian
Snake River water users would receive proportionate access to a maximum
of 19,000 annual acre-feet of unallocated federal storage space in the
Palisades Reservoir, and 80,000 annual acre-feet of unallocated federal
storage space in the Ririe Reservoir.246 Maximum yield of these two
storage spaces could provide non-Indian users with enough water to irrigate
40,000 acres annually. 247 Last, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe would
gradually phase in 15,000 acre-feet of the Tribe's annual Snake River water
storage rights to provide non-Indian users time to adjust to a future with
lower levels of water availability. 248
Finally, the proposed Fort Hall legislative claims settlement involved
predictable controversies over cost total and funding contributions.
Originally, the bills called for a $22 million federal contribution paid over a
twenty-year period. 24 9 The amended House Bill 5308 appropriated this
same sum over a three-year period. 2 50 This amended effort reflected a
compromise between federal concerns over the need for long-term
economic fiscal responsibility and a tribal desire to receive a conclusive
settlement that would not be diluted by incremental installments. 251' The
CBO calculated the federal responsibility as $22 million over three years,
without including the loss of leasing revenues for unallocated water storage
252
The State of Idaho would contribute a total of $500,000, with half
space.
of this sum consisting of in-kind services for implementation and half to
pay federal filing fees for associated water adjudication needs. 25 3 Local
government loss of water rights raised the state/local contribution to as
much as $25 million. 25 4 Indian and non-Indian users would also have to
pay for operation and maintenance costs in developing their water rights. 255
In introducing the bill, Senator McClure opined, "the parties have crafted
an agreement that results in a true win-win situation."256 Considering the
Administration's efforts in helping to craft the amended legislation, it came
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. H.R. REP.No. 101-831, at 1(1990).
250. Id. In addition, the federal government would contribute 100,000 acre-feet of
unallocated water storage space for non-Indian users. Id.
251. Id.at 1-2.
252. Id. at 14.
253. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 88-89 (1990).
254. Id. at 89.
255. Id. at 88-89.
256. 136 CONG. REc. S9978, S9979 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990).
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as no surprise that the President eventually approved and signed House Bill
5308 into law.
VI. Fallon Paiute Shoshone and PyramidLake Water Settlement
The 101st Congress also passed settlement legislation relating to water
rights of the Fallon Pointe Shoshones and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.
Congress passed the Act in October and the President approved the Act on
November 16, 1990 as Public Law 101-618.257
The amended legislation separated the Act into two titles. 258 Both titles
revolved around issues surrounding the Newlands Project. The TruckeeCarson Irrigation District operated the Newlands Project and supplied
irrigation water for 60,000 acres of land near Fallon, Nevada. 25 9 The
Newlands Project used Truckee and Carson River water stored in Lake
Tahoe and the Lahontan Reservoir on the Carson River.2 6 0
The first title addressed a water rights settlement for the Fallon Paiute
Shoshone Indian Tribe, and included a dismissal of all Fallon Paiute
Shoshone water claims.261 The next title was a committee amendment that
provided water rights settlement of the Truckee and Carson Rivers and
Pyramid Lake.262 The provisions of this title were included in the amended
House Bill 2567.263 This title, like previous Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake
legislation, served to ratify and expand upon a controversial 1970
agreement between the States of Nevada and California, the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe, and other users over allocation of Truckee, Walker, and
Carson Rivers in the Lake Tahoe Basin.26 Senator Reid pointed out that
the problem of water availability in the West was "mounting toward crisis
proportions" and required some sort of resolution with respect to the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe water rights.26 5
When Newlands Project water diversions diminished the level of
Pyramid Lake and simultaneously reduced the output of tribal fisheries, the
257. S. REP. No. 101-555, at 8 (1990). Senator Reid (D-NV) and Senator Inouye (DHW) introduced Senate Bill 3084 on September 20, 1990. Id.
258. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, S.
3084, 101st Cong. (1990); 136 CONG. REC. S13509 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1990).
259. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 48; 136 CONG. REc. S13508-03 (1990).
260. S. REP. 101-499, at 49.
261. S. 3084, 101st Cong., tit. I (1990). STOPPED HERE
262. Id. tit. II; S. REP. No. 101-555, at 8.
263. S. REP. NO. 101-499, at 48.
264. Id.
265. 135 CONG. REc. S10296 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989).
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Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe filed a series of lawsuits asserting a Winters
right for additional water rights necessary to sustain the Lake's original
surface level. Those suits involved fishery water rights, and environmental
impacts on the area. Those suits eventually allowed the Tribe to receive the
beneficial legislative settlement as outlined in Senate Bill 3084.
A. Title 1: FallonPaiute Shoshone Water Rights Settlement
1. History of the Claims
The General Allotment Act of 1887 allowed 31,000 acres to be allotted
by 1895 for the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribe in an area ten miles
east of Fallon, Nevada.2 66 The Secretary of the Interior began plans to build
the Newlands Project on land that overlapped the Fallon Paiute Shoshone
26
Indian reservation.267 In 1906, the federal government offered the Fallon
Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribe ten acres of irrigated land for every 160 acres
of non-irrigated land that the Tribe gave up to make room for the Newlands
All in all, individual tribal members gave up more than 30,000
Project. 268Alinaliniiulmr
2 69
acres in exchange for 4640 acres that would be irrigated by the Project.
not irrigable due
The land exchange included at least 1600 acres that were 270
to poor drainage, typography, soil quality, or salt presence.
In any case, the promise of Newlands Project irrigation water never
arrived. 271 The Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribe never received any kind of
Newlands Project irrigation system until the passage of Public Law 95-337
in 1978, which directed the Secretary of the Interior to formulate a plan for
the improvement and construction of an irrigation system that could
cultivate at least 1800 acres for agriculture on the Fallon Paiute Shoshone
Reservation.2 72 The Reservation currently occupies an area totaling 8120
2 3
acres (3480 acres owned by the tribe and 4640 acres individually owned). 7
Because the federal government never enforced Public Law 95-337, and
because new regulations conflicted with the old legislation, the Tribe had to
266. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 56.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. S. REP.No. 101-555, at 2 (1990).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. An Act to Declare That All Right, Title, and Interest of the United States in Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Acres More or Less, Are Hereby Held in Trust for the Paiute and
Shoshone Tribes of the Fallon Indian Reservation and Colony, Pub. L. No. 95-337, 92 Stat.
455, 455 (1978).
273. S. REP.No. 101-499, at 56.
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pursue either costly litigation or a legislative settlement to resolve its
outstanding water rights issues.
2. ProposedLegislative Settlement
Title 1 of Senate Bill 3084 served to extinguish tribal litigation over the
federal failure to comply with Public Law 95-337 and disputes over the
Tribe's other water rights claims, in exchange for a $43 million Fallon
Paiute Shoshone Tribal Settlement Fund.274 The Tribe could spend only
20% of the principal of the Fund on securing water rights or land purchases,
with subsequent interest payments deposited to restore the original
principal. 2 75 The Tribe could use interest that accumulated on fully intact
principal, however, for long-term economic development, tribal
government and community services, per capita distributions to tribal
members, existing irrigation systems, and additional land or water rights
acquisitions.276 Tribal government representatives and the Secretary of the
Interior would cooperate in creating a Tribal Economic Development
Plan.277 The Tribe also retained the right to object to any future revisions in
Newlands Project regulations.278
3. ControversialIssues in Settlement Legislation
Although the Secretary of the Interior expressed some concern over the
settlement cost, Title 1 of Senate Bill 3084 was relatively controversy-free.
The Department of the Interior was opposed to the discrete allowance for
distribution of settlement funds on a per capita basis, even though per capita
distributions would apply to only 20% of any accrued interest beyond the
original principal in the Development Fund.2 79 Almost all of the 850
members of the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Reservation lived on the
Reservation, where the average per capita individual income was one third
of the nation's average and the average per capita family income was less
than one half of the norm. 2 80 The only alternative that the federal
government had to the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Economic Development
Fund was to compensate the Tribe with expanded irrigation for agriculture
274. S. REP. NO. 101-555, at 2.
275. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, S.
3084, 101st Cong. (1990).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. S. REP. No. 101-555, at 2-3.
280. S. REP.No. 101-499, at 56 (1990).
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that would have come at the expense of other uses like the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe fishery or the Lahontan Wetlands.28 1
In 1988, the Department of the Interior estimated the cost of fulfilling the
federal government's responsibilities in Public Law 95-337 at $30 million
with additional annual maintenance and operating costs of $100,000 to
$150,000.282 A University of Nevada at Reno study estimated the costs
associated with the original 1906 Newlands Project land acquisition over
time at $100 million to $150 million.283 With these enormous cost
estimates in mind and the lack of any suitable alternative, the only
controversy about Title I was its association with Title 2 - the proposed
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement.
B. Title 2: Truckee-Carson-PyramidLake Water Settlement
1. History of the Claims
In 1859, the Secretary of the Interior reserved an historic homeland of
475,000 acres surrounding and including Pyramid Lake and the Lower
Truckee River for the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.284 The Truckee and
Carson Rivers run parallel to each other in an easterly direction, with the
Truckee River running from Lake Tahoe to Pyramid Lake and the Carson
River running from Lake Tahoe to the Stillwater Wildlife Management
Area and Carson Sink (both of which are a part of the Lahontan Valley
Wetlands).285 The States of Nevada and California both use water from the
2 86
Rivers, and have contested associated water rights since the 1800s.
In 1950, negotiations began and the states reached an allocation
agreement in 1968.287 Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Tribe water rights
settled independently in two earlier cases. The Alpine case dealt with
Carson River, and Orr Ditch cases dealt with the Truckee River. Because
the tribal water rights were already established, the ongoing negotiations
centered on state allocations of water rights.2 88 The Nevada Legislature
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50.
See Lahontan Basin Area Office Map of Truckee and Carson River Basins, BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, available at http://www.usbr.gov/mp/lbao/
map.html (last updated July 25, 2011).
286. S. REP.NO. 101-499, at 58.
287. Id.
288. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir, 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980),
modified, 687 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 U.S. 193 (1983); United States v.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
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ratified the agreement in 1969, and California followed in 1970.289 The two
States have been acting in voluntary compliance with the settlement
allocation ever since, and at least eight bills seeking congressional
ratification of this water rights allocation emerged after 1971 .290 But even
though Pyramid Lake Paiute Winters rights were established, litigation filed
by the Tribe stood in the way of Congress ratifying the Nevada and
California agreement. 291
When the federal government built the Newlands Reclamation Project in
1906 and diverted Truckee River waters, water levels in Pyramid Lake
began to drop.292 A delta eventually emerged at the mouth of Pyramid
Lake, making it nearly impossible for the native Cui-ui fish and the
Lahontan Cutthroat trout to spawn and reproduce in lake waters.2 93
Subsequent litigation filed by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe centered
around the harmful environmental effects of the Newlands Project on
Pyramid Lake.294 Indeed, Truckee River diversions for the Newland's
Project caused Pyramid Lake to drop over one hundred feet since the
establishment of the Reservation.295 As the Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District and other Truckee River water users in Nevada and California
faced litigation threats from the Tribe, they reduced water diversions and
increased the efficiency of the Newlands Project. 29 6 Still, reduced
diversions had little effect on the dropping water levels of a thirsty Pyramid
Lake and the increased efficiency unwittingly led to an additional
environmental hazard.297 The original Newlands Project had eliminated
vast tracts of wetlands, and substituted agricultural drainage for natural
flows in remaining areas.298 The Lahontan Valley Wetlands, part of the
Stillwater Wildlife Management Area along with the Stillwater National
Wildlife Refuge and Carson Lake and Pasture, dramatically shrunk and was

Orr Water Ditch Co., Docket No. A3 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 1944), available at http://waterlaw.com/decrees/Orditchdecree.pdf.
289. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 48.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 50.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. KNACK & STEWART, supra note 104, at 42.
296. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 50. The Truckee-Carson Irrigation District is the operator
of the Newlands Project.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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only sustained by agricultural drainage spills from the Newlands Project.299
Thus, increased efficiency at the Newlands Project meant even less water
for the sensitive and ecologically valuable Lahontan Valley Wetlands.oo
2. ProposedLegislative Settlement
Title 2 also sought to extinguish pending litigation that existed between
the Tribe and local, state, and federal governments. The Bill established a
development fund for the Tribe, served to ratify and expand Truckee and
Carson River water allocation rights first formulated in the Alpine and Orr
Ditch decrees, and instructed the Secretary to confront the environmental
issues raised by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.or
Once the tribal government developed a long-term economic plan that
was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, the Tribe would receive
access to a $50 million Pyramid Lake Paiute Economic Development
Fund.3 02 In addition, the Secretary would establish a Pyramid Lake Paiute
Fisheries Trust Fund totaling $25 million.303 The Tribe could not
compromise either the principal or 25% of the interest on the fishery fund,
but could fully utilize the remaining interest for fishery improvement
programs.
Title 2 also confirmed the Tribe's "Alpine Decree" water rights
allocation for the Carson River and its tributaries.30 The Bill established a
maximum annual diversion level for the Lake Tahoe Basin of 34,000 acrefeet, with 23,000 acre-feet for use by California within the Lake Tahoe
Basin and 11,000 acre-feet allocated for Nevada use in the Basin. 3 06 Other
approved water diversions included 3000 acre-feet annually from Marlette
Lake for Nevada use, and a maximum of 561 acre-feet annually from Lake
Tahoe for Nevada use as well.307 State law or existing court allocations
would allocate Echo Lake in California, North Creek in Nevada, and the
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, S.
3084, 101st Cong., §§ 201-203 (1990).
302. Id. § 102(B), (C)(1)(a).
303. Id. § 208(a)(2).
304. Id.
305. Id. The Bill also allocated a maximum of 1300 acre-feet of Carson River waters to
the State of California, and an extra 2131 acre-feet for the State of Nevada. Id.
306. Id. This maximum annual diversion level would not apply to any water used to
make artificial snow for ski resorts within the Lake Tahoe Basin. Id.
307. Id. Unmetered resident diversions were estimated at only 4/10ths of an acre-foot
per resident annually, and thus did not pose a great concern. Id.
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interstate Truckee River, including the Orr Ditch Decree for the Truckee
River. 308 Finally, the Bill confirmed a forty-year lease of Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe water rights as drought protection for the Nevada urban centers
of Reno and Sparks. 3 09 These two municipalities were totally dependent on
the flow of the Truckee River for their water, and were witnessing an
unprecedented "critical drought period."30 o The settlement in Title 2
essentially ratified a preliminary agreement between California, Nevada,
the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Tribe, the United States federal
government, and the Sierra Pacific Power Company.3 1
Title 2 also contained several provisions relating to environmental issues.
First, the Secretary of the Interior had to comply with the Endangered
Species Act by developing a plan within one year for the recovery of
Cui-cui fish and Lahontan Cutthroat trout within the Pyramid Lake and
Truckee River ecosystem.3 12 In addition, the Bill included a maximum
allocation of $4 million annually over the following four years for the
Secretary of the Interior to purchase water rights to benefit wetlands
protection efforts in federal and state wildlife areas in the Lahontan Valley
and the Fernley Sink in Nevada.3 13 The Bill also required the Secretary to
conclude a study within two years evaluating whether the Lahontan Valley
Wetlands and the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge should become a
permanent National Wildlife Refuge or a Federal Wildlife Management
Area.314 Finally, the Bill recognized Anaho Island, within the borders of
Pyramid Lake, as part of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Reservation and as an
integral component of the National Wildlife Refuge system.

308. Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, S. 1554, 101st Cong.,

§ 102 (1989).
309. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 21 (1990); 135 CONG. REc. S10296, S10301 (daily ed. Aug.
4, 1989).
310. 135 CONG. REc. at S10301 (stating that the level of drought was unknown since that
of 1928-35).
311. S. REP. No. 10 1-499, at 24. This company provides water to Reno, Sparks, and
parts of Washoe county as well as electricity to northern Nevada and east central California.
135 CONG. REC. at S10301.
312. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 17.
313. Id. at 14,17.
314. Id. at 15-16. The Bill also contained a provision that funds would be appropriated
for the Naval Air Station five miles east of Fallon, Nevada to replace its alfalfa and pasture
oriented "agricultural outlease program" of leasing 3000 irrigated acres of land along
runways to farmers with an alternative that would satisfy Navy dust abatement and fire
safety regulations. Id. Any extra water rights that materialized from any alternative would
be transferred to the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation for fishery purposes. Id.
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3. ControversialIssues in Settlement Legislation
Two controversial issues with Title 2 were environmental issues and the
Pyramid Lake settlement cost. The general federal government consensus
was a recommendation of executive veto, although several representatives
such as the Assistant Secretary for Water and Science in the Department of
the Interior expressed willingness to negotiate a final settlement.31
The environmental controversy centered around two concerns. The first
was the recovery plan for the Cui-ui and Lahontan Cutthroat trout of
Pyramid Lake. The second concern was the degradation of the Lahontan
Valley Wetlands.
The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and Fishery had certain objectives
regarding the lower Truckee River up to and including the terminus delta at
the mouth of Pyramid Lake and the Lake itself.3 16 These included restoring
riparian habitat and vegetation cover, stabilizing the River to minimize
erosion, improving the spawning and migratory habitat for Cui-ui fish and
Lahontan Cutthroat trout, and improving or replacing facilities to help fish
pass the delta at the mouth of the Truckee River to reach Derby Dam and
upstream spawning habitats.3 17 The Tribe wished to achieve all of these
The
objectives without harming the Lahontan Valley Wetlands.' 18
restoration of suitable habitat for the Cui-ui and Lahontan Cutthroat Trout
and the maintenance of fragile wetlands were important legislative
priorities, as 20% of the surrounding Churchill County economy directly
relied on tourism and fish and bird-related recreational activities at the
time.31 9
Also, Pyramid Lake was evaporating at an alarming pace of four feet per
year (approximately 440,000 acre-feet annually). 32 0 For the Lake to
maintain its great depth of 360 feet and surface area of 115,000 acres, it
needed a consistent flow from the Truckee River to replace evaporated
water. 32 1 Newlands Project diversions dramatically disrupted this balance
between input and evaporation that had combined to maintain a consistent
level for Pyramid Lake.322 From 1920 to 1938, the Lake level dropped over
315.
316.
Cong.,
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, H.R. 3941, 101st
§ 701(d) (1990).
Id. § 402(a).
Id. § 701(d).
Id. § 301(b)(2).
KNACK & STEWART, supra note 104, at 272.
Id.
Id.
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forty feet, reducing the surface area by 20,000 acres and forming a delta at
the mouth of Pyramid Lake that prevented fish from reaching Truckee
River spawning grounds.323 This dramatic drop in surface levels was due to
the fact that from 1925 to 1967, the Newlands Project annually diverted
over 50% of the Truckee River flow, or approximately 260,000 acre-feet, to
the Derby Dam.324 A BIA investigation of Pyramid Lake in 1940 revealed
that the administration was "one of the most flagrant examples" of a neglect
of trust responsibilities, disregard for Indian rights, and waste of natural
resources. 32 5 When the Cui-ui became endangered in 1970, the Secretary
was obligated to use 220,000 acre-feet of storage space in Stampede
Reservoir for the sole purposes of maintaining the meager population of
Pyramid Lake fish. The use of Stampede Reservoir did not solve the root
environmental problems at Pyramid Lake, however, and the municipalities
of Reno and Sparks lost important water rights storage space.326
A series of subsequent general Operating Criteria and Procedures
("OCAP") regulations governing the allocation of Truckee and Carson
River water rights did little to alleviate the environmental problems.327 The
federal government understood the need for a recovery plan for the Cui-ui
and Lahontan Cutthroat trout as required by the Endangered Species Act,
but objected to the fiscal burden of an additional tribal development fund.328
The Stillwater Wetlands of the Truckee/Carson area support millions of
migratory waterfowl that use the eastern edge of the Pacific Flyway as a
resting place in their seasonal travels. 3 29 Diversions to the Newlands
Project had caused these Wetlands to reduce from 113,000 acres to only
15,000 acres in 1987.330 The Newlands Project either eliminated the water
source for these Wetlands, or substituted decreasing agricultural drainage as
Project efficiency increased.
Included in the Stillwater Wildlife Management Area are the Lahontan
Valley Wetlands, located at the terminus of the Carson River. 331 The
323. Id. at 178.
324. Id. at 271, 273
325. Id. at 320-21.
326. S. REP. No. 101-499, at 52-53 (1990) (citing Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Clarke, 741 F. 2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984)).
327. Id.
3 2 8. Id.
329. Id. at 55. Indeed, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance had
recently nominated the Stillwater area as a wetland of international importance. Id.
330. Id. at 54.
331. See Lahontan Basin Area Office Map of Truckee and Carson River Basins, supra
note 285.
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Lahontan Valley Wetlands had dried up from historic levels of 50,000 acres
to a meager 3000 acres. 3 32 The remaining area contained concentrated
mineral deposits that had become toxic.333 Nevada's Senator Reid noted,
"Where there were once scores of thousands of acres of luxuriant wetlands
and millions of shorebirds and waterfowl, there are now only stagnant
pools." 33 4 These natural but toxic levels of trace elements, including
arsenic, boron, lithium, mercury, selenium, and molybdenum, caused
increased bioaccumulation, deformities, botulism, avian cholera, and death
among fish and waterfowl that visited the Lahontan Valley Wetlands. 33 5 In
addition, the greater concentration of fish and fowl caused by the shrinking
habitat led to the possibility of disease transmission in fish and waterfowl
previously untouched by the toxins. 3 The State of Nevada had even sent
its citizens a warning not to eat ducks that might have visited the Lahontan
Valley Wetlands.337
The Interior Department expressed concern in a letter to Idaho's Senator
McClure that the Bill contained water rights transfer selection processes
that were vague and less authoritative than existing Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations. The Assistant Secretary worried that these amended
regulations might harm federal efforts at restoring the Wetlands, or allow
the Tribe to compromise environmental guidelines in utilizing water
resource rights.338
At a hearing regarding the Wetlands in Reno, the Nevada Department of
Wildlife Director gave a stern warning that "[i]f the Lahontan Valley
Wetlands are lost, it will be the greatest natural resource disaster in this

century in Nevada." 3 39
In addition to the national loss of a valuable resource, the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe historically benefitted from the diverse waterfowl population
in the Lahontan Valley Wetlands via cultural, economic, and sustenance
uses. Historian Martha Knack has recorded Paiute accounts of how the
skies above Pyramid Lake once "darkened" with snow geese, Canadian
geese, mallards, pintails, canvasbacks, goldeneyes, teal, stilts, avocets,
curlews, killdeer, and pelicans in flight towards the Lahontan Valley
332. KNACK & STEWART, supra note 104, at 272.

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
135 CONG. REc. S10296, S10297 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989).
S. REP. No. 101-499, at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 80.

339.

135 CONG. REc. at S10297.
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Wetlands. In addition to the food source potential that migratory fowl once
represented to Pyramid Lake Paiutes, the Tribe used cattail fibers, swamp
340
cane, marsh rushes, and willow for clothing, baskets, and other purposes.
In fact, it was these dramatic levels of waterfowl in the Lahontan Valley
Wetlands that led to its dedication along with only three other sites as a
Western Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve. 34 1
The second major controversy involved settlement cost.3 42 The Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe felt that the settlement was fair in light of the history of
federal mismanagement of tribal interests, and in exchange for the dismissal
of pending legal actions relating to federal failures to enforce national
environmental laws. The federal government felt that the Tribe would reap
enough benefits from the restoration of the Lahontan Valley Wetlands,
however, and that the additional expenditure of a settlement fund was
unnecessary.3 43 The CBO estimated a federal cost of $75 million for the
proposed trust and fishery funds, with an additional $16 million from 1991
to 1995 for environmental studies and $2 million over twenty years for the
Office Director Robert Reischauer
cancellation of repayment contracts.
also warned of the possibility of an additional $50 million to $100 million
federal obligations to mitigate water quality or wildlife habitat damage
issues.345
Certain members of the federal government felt that the proposed
settlement funds were excessive considering that Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe water rights were already settled.346 The federal government believed
that the lawsuits were subject to dismissal because the proposed legislative
settlement did not pose enough of a financial risk to warrant such a large
payment to the Tribe.34 7 Interior Department representations also noted
existing federal commitments to Pyramid Lake water quality issues. 348 The
340. KNACK & STEWART, supra note 104, at 10, 17.
341. S. REP.No. 101-499, at 55.
342. Id.passim.
343. Id. at 113.
344. Id. at 93.
345. Id. at 91.
346. Id. at 114.
347. Id. at 114-18.
348. Id. at 114. The existing federal commitments included the Orr Ditch water rights
decree, federal government payment of $7.5 million in 1975, conversion of the Stampede
Dam and Reservoir for the exclusive use of enhancing and allowing spawning fish runs,
existing federal commitments to the Pyramid Lake fisheries that totaled $20 million over the
next fifteen years, federal funding of fish production at the Lahontan National Fish
Hatchery, preparation costs for environmental recovery plans, and a $7.6 million allocation
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Interior instead proposed a $5 million settlement for the Tribe in exchange
for a release of all tribal claims, including those regarding alleged federal
failures to enforce the Endangered Species Act.34 9
Federal representatives also believed that the benchmark replacement
water cost of $1000 to $2000 per foot was extremely high, and represented
annual costs in perpetuity rather than as one-time water recoupment
costs. 350 The federal government felt that monetary damages should be
calculated based on fish losses and not water losses.3 1 All of these reasons
led the Department of Justice, the OMB, and the Department of the Interior
to recommend executive disapproval of the Pyramid Lake Paiute legislative
settlement proposal.352
VII. Ute (UT) Indian Water Claims Settlement
The 101st Congress also tried to resolve Ute Indian water rights claims
in Utah through a legislative settlement proposal. This legislative effort
took the form of House Bill 1285 and Senate Bill 536, the Ute Indian Water
Settlement Act of 1989.
Congress ultimately incorporated the key
components of House Bill 1285 and Senate Bill 536 into House Bill 3960,
known as the Central Utah Project Completion Act and Reclamation
Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1990.354
The bills addressed the Utah Ute Indians' water rights claims,
specifically those of the Uintah and Ouray reservation,5 and sought to
resolve claims stemming from a 1965 agreement between the federal

for fish ladder and spawning runs at the Marble Bluff Dam, increased Newlands efficiency
due to OCAP regulations, and federal payment of attorney fees for the Tribe's litigation
efforts. Id. at 114-17.
349. Id. at 114.
350. H.R. REP. No. 10 1-499, at 114-20 (1990).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 118-20.
353. 135 CONG. REc. S2352 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1989). Senator Garn (R-UT) and Senator
Hatch (R-UT) proposed Senate Bill 536, and it died in the committee process. S. REP. No.
101-499, at 114. Representative Nielson (R-UT) introduced Ute Indian Water Settlement
Act of 1989, H.R. 1285, 101st Cong. (1989).
Representative Hansen (R-UT) and
Representative Owens (D-UT) co-sponsored the Bill. Id
354. Central Utah Project Completion Act, H.R. 3960, 101st Cong. (1990). The House
of Representatives passed House Bill 3960 on October 15, 1990, but the Bill died on the
Senate calendar - dashing any hopes for a piece of successful Ute (UT) Indian water rights
settlement legislation in the 101st Congress. H.R. REP. No. 101-764, at pt. 1 (1990).
355. S. REP.No. 101-499, at 114.
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government and the Ute Tribe.356 This agreement compromised the Ute's
Winters rights to Central Utah Project waters in exchange for alternative
Winters delivery rights, and required mitigation by a January 1, 2005, target
date. 5 7 The 2005 deadline was both a federal burden and incentive for
congressional action. Although the Ute settlement had a concrete deadline,
it could be put off for fifteen years during the 101st Congress without
violating any major legal issues.
A. History of the Claims
The Ute Indians had a long record of communal living in what is now
Utah, as well as parts of western Colorado, northern New Mexico, and
northern Arizona. 5 Utah Indian Agent Garland Hurt recorded evidence of
irrigated Ute agricultural practices in his reports from the 1850s.359
The Uintah and Ouray Reservations are in northeast Utah at the foot of
the Uinta Mountains in Uinta Basin. 360 The reservations total 4 million
acres, combining fee land, national forest, Bureau of Land Management
land, and 1 million acres of trust land.3 ' On October 3, 1861, the federal
government recognized the Uintah Reservation by Executive Order - with
enough water rights to irrigate all agriculturally practical reservation
acreage.362 The federal government established the Ouray Reservation in
1882, and by the 1990s, these two reservations were the home of 3,400 Ute
of Utah Indians.363 Rock Creek and the Duchesne, Lake Fork, Uinta, and
Whiterocks Rivers all pass through the reservations to the Green River and
on to the Colorado River. 36 Under the provisions of the 1965 Agreement,
however, the federal government diverted most of these water resources to
the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project for the Salt Lake City urban
area and southern Utah agricultural lands.365
356. Id. § 1901(a)(2).
357. 135 CONG. REC. H539-03 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1989). Representative Owens (D-UT)
and Representative Nielson (R-UT) had introduced similar legislation in 1988. S. REP. No.
101-499, at 114.
358. S. LYMAN TYLER, THE UTE PEOPLE: A BIOGRAPHICAL CHECKLIST 1 (1964).
359. Gottfried 0. Lang, The Whiterock Utes in Transition, in 15 UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PAPERS 13 (1953).

360.
361.
362.
S. 536,
363.
364.
365.

H.R. REP.No. 101-764, at 51 (1990).
Id.
A Bill to Settle Issues Relating to Ute Indian Water Rights, and for Other Purposes,
101st Cong., § (3)(1) (1989).
H.R.REP.NO. 101-764,at5l.
Id.
Id.
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The 1965 Agreement between the United States government, the Ute
tribe, and the Central Utah Water Conservancy District included a provision
that three additional units would be built as part of the Central Utah Project
to provide the Ute Indians with sufficient water supply in lieu of tribal
366
Winters rights so that water could be diverted to the Bonneville unit.
Despite this 1965 Agreement, the federal government stalled the
construction of the promised Upalco and Uintah units because it was unable
367
Congress never
to find adequate or economically feasible reservoir sites.
proceed with
to
plans
no
were
authorized the third Ute unit, and there
368
Meanwhile, the Ute Indians were without a reliable water
construction.
supply and had filed litigation regarding alleged federal breaches of the
369
1965 Agreement.
The proposed legislative settlement would have given the Tribe a $150
million trust fund, close to 250,000 annual acre-feet in water rights, and a
series of other benefits as compensation for the federal use of 15,252 acres
of Ute irrigable farmland and gross water diversions of 61,008 annual acrefeet to the Bonneville unit since the 1965 Agreement.3 70 In introducing the
Bill, Senator Garn of Utah declared that the settlement would force the
federal government to keep its word to the Ute people.
B. ProposedLegislative Settlement
The settlement would have extinguished several Ute claims based on the
federal government's failure to comply with the 1965 Agreement between
the United States government, the Ute tribe, and the Central Utah Water
Conservancy District (the project operator).372 Although the legislative
deadline was 2005, the lack of any preliminary federal action or even
revised cost estimates made it clear that the federal government and the
Central Utah Project operator could not fulfill their obligations under the
1965 Agreement. The bills, therefore, sought $514,550,000 to pay for a

366. Id. The three additional units would be called the Uintah, Upalco and Ute. Id.
367. Id.
368. Central Utah Project Completion Act, H.R. 3960, 101st Cong., § 401 (1990).
369. Id.
370. Bill to Settle Issues Relating to Ute Indian Water Rights, and for Other Purposes, S.
536, 101st Cong., § 5(a) (1989). The 1965 Agreement, in turn, would be dissolved. S. REP.
No. 101-499, at 33 (1990).
371. 135 CONG. REc. S2352 (daily ed. Mar. 8,1989) (statement of Sen. E.J. Garn).
372. Bill to Settle Issues Relating to Ute Indian Water Rights, and for Other Purposes §
3(2)-(12).
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variety of Ute water needs in exchange for resolution of the Tribes' Winters
rights, pending litigation and the original 1965 Agreement.373
The legislation aimed to settle all claims stemming from Winters rights
or the 1965 Agreement and quantify Ute tribal water rights at a total of
248,943 annual acre-feet from the Colorado River System.374 In addition,
the Tribes would receive water rights to 10,000 acre-feet annually from the
Green River for municipal and industrial purposes.3 75 All told, these water
rights would allow for the possibility of 120,157 irrigable acres on the Ute
Reservations.3 76
C. ControversialIssues in Settlement Legislation
The enormous cost of the Bill was the most controversial element of the
proposed Ute settlement. The complexity of the legislation and the
inclusion of provisions that were not directly related to the Ute water
allotment were also controversial during the legislative process.
The Utes felt that the completion of the Central Utah Project as
envisioned in the 1965 Agreement was at risk.377 The federal government
had estimated the cost of completing the Uintah, Upalco, and Ute Units at
over $2 billion in 1988.378 The Tribes wanted some sort of resolution to
their water rights dilemma without waiting for inevitable federal failure by
the 2005 implementation deadline. 37 9 The Tribes felt that the cost of the
settlement was fair in light of the water losses the Utes had endured and
current cost estimates for Central Utah Project construction completion.380
In addition, the Tribes expressed concern that actual completion of the
Project could harm local trout fisheries, destroy wetlands and riparian
habitats, diminish the amount of big game winter range, create excessive
water discharges and have negative water-quality impacts due to irrigation
drainage flows. 38'

373. Id. § 4.
374. Id. art. III.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 15-16. The Tribes could not transfer any of these water rights without the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
377. S. 536 § 3 (1990).
378. Id. § 3(8).
379. Id. § 3(2).
380. Id. §3(12).
381. H. REP. No. 101-764, at 51 (1990).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol37/iss1/4

No. 1]

RESOURCE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT LEGISLATION

159

The original bills included proposed cost allocations totaling
$514,550,000 plus water rights for the Ute tribe.382 The Director of the
CBO, Robert Reishchauer, estimated the cost of an Ute Indian water rights
settlement, as amended, at close to $200 million with 35% of the cost
absorbed by state and local interests.
Both of these possible settlement amounts were unacceptable from the
federal government standpoint.384 The Senate Report on the 1990
Reclamation Act included what appeared to be a thinly veiled criticism of
the proposed Ute legislation:
The agreement [Fort Hall] does not require construction of any
new water storage facilities. Unlike some recent Indian water
settlements involving Federal contributions of hundreds of
millions of dollars for construction of water projects of
substantial
and
justification
economic
questionable
environmental costs, the parties to this agreement developed
creative exchanges of water supplies which more efficiently use
available water resources with no added financial or
environmental cost.385
Eventually, however, Congress had to deal with unsettled Ute water
rights and supported a legislative claims settlement. In 1992, Congress
settled the Ute water rights dispute for a settlement totaling $198.5
million. 8 6
VIII. San CarlosApache Water Rights Settlement
Finally, the 101st Congress unsuccessfully tried to pass water rights
claims settlement legislation relating to the San Carlos Apache Tribe of
Arizona.38 ' The House of Representatives passed House Bill 5539 on
382. A Bill to Settle Issues Relating to Ute Indian Water Rights, and for Other Purposes,
S. 536, § 4; Indian Water Settlement Act of 1989, H.R. 1285, 101st Cong., § 4 (1989).
383. H.R. REP.No. 101-764, at 57.
384. Id.
385. S.REP.No. 101-499, at 88 (1990).
386. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 2, at 828.
387. San Carlos Apache Water Rights Settlement, H.R. 5539, 101st Cong. (1990).
Representative Udall (D-AZ) and Representative Rhodes (R-AZ) introduced the San Carlos
Apache Water Rights Settlement on August 3, 1990. 136 CONG. REc. H7171 (daily ed. Aug.
3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Tom Udall). The congressmen also introduced a predecessor to
the Bill on June 28, 1990, i.e., San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of
1990, H.R. 5223, 101st Cong. (1990). Congress took no action on House Bill 5223. H.R.
REP. No. 101-918, at 14 (1990).
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October 22, 1990, but the Bill died in the Senate, effectively killing any
chance for the San Carlos Apache Tribe to obtain legislative settlement of
their water rights in the 101st Congress.
House Bill 5539 proposed to settle San Carlos Apache water rights
claims litigation. 38 9 In 1935, the "Gila Decree" Agreement quantified the
water rights of the San Carlos Apache Tribe.390 Subsequent upstream
diversions made it impossible to implement the Gila Decree Agreement,
and the State of Arizona attempted to settle the matter by initiating General
Stream Adjudication of the Gila River in 1978.391 After years of
negotiations, federal, state, local, and tribal representatives crafted the
proposed agreement included in the settlement legislation.392
A. History of the Claims
The aboriginal territory of the Apache Indians covered much of what is
eastern Arizona today.393 Early Spanish accounts documented Apaches
living on small farms with irrigated agriculture and engaged in hunting,
gathering, and nomadic activities.394
On July 1, 1852, the federal
government agreed to authorize a reservation for the Tribe. 3 95 After years
of federal and migrant efforts to confine, relocate, and encroach upon the
San Carlos Apache, President Ulysses Grant finally created a reservation
for the Tribe in 1871. 3 The federal government modified the reservation
boundaries in 1973, settling on a total of 1,826,500 acres in the Gila,
Graham, and Pinal Counties of east central Arizona.39 7 The reservation is
bound on the north by the Salt and Black Rivers, and is intersected in the
southern portion by the Gila River.39 8
Non-Indian settlers had stolen San Carlos Apache water rights, putting
the health of the Tribe's crops at risk in the 1880s.399 During this period,
speculators discovered coal in the area. Both the influx of miners and the

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

San Carlos Apache Water Rights Settlement, H.R. 5539, 101st Cong. (1990).
Id. § 2(a)(5).
H.R. REP.No. 101-918, at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
H.R. 5539 § 2(a)(8).
H.R. REP.No. 101-918, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
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4 00
existing needs of non-Indian settlers increased strains on water supplies.
In 1910, the federal government sought water rights for the nearby Fort
40
The federal
McDowell community in the infamous Kent Decree case.
government overlooked the rights of the San Carlos Apache at the time,
however, and the Tribe received no benefits from either the Salt River
Project or any other legally quantified water rights under the Winters
precedent.40 2
In 1924, Congress therefore authorized the San Carlos Project to
403
The federal government
alleviate the water rights problems of the Tribe.
Dam on the Gila
Coolidge
the
behind
Project
the
built the main reservoir of
4
the San Carlos
of
farmland
River. 04 And although the best irrigated
Apache Tribe flooded during construction of the Dam, the Tribe never
40 5
received any water or water storage rights upon completion.
Frustration over this inequity mounted until federal, state, local, and
tribal parties entered into a "Gila Decree" agreement in 1935, granting the
406
This
San Carlos Apache Tribe 6000 acre-feet of annual water rights.
minimal annual water rights allotment - reduced from 36,000 acre-feet to
6000 acre-feet just before conclusion - was unrealistic and could not
quench one million acres of irrigable land on the San Carlos Apache
Reservation.4 07 Additionally, upstream diversions kept the Gila River dry
anyway, making it impossible for the Tribe to receive its meager Gila
Decree water rights.408
The Tribe therefore filed a series of claims and the State of Arizona
attempted to settle the issue by initiating General Stream Adjudication of
the Gila River in 1978.409 The federal government represented the Tribe as
a trustee and requested 292,406 annual acre-feet in water rights in this
adjudication of the Gila River. 4 10 The pending litigation threatened the

400. Id.
401. Id. at 12.
402. CANBY, supranote 21, at 280.
403. H.R. REP. NO. 101-918, at 12.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 13.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. The Tribe attempted to bring the matter to federal court and was rejected in the
1983 Supreme Court decision of Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 547
(1983).
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assured water supply of over one million non-Indians living in the Salt and
Gila River Valleys.4 1 1
B. ProposedLegislative Settlement
House Bill 5539 included a settlement that would have extinguished all
present and future water rights related claims raised by the San Carlos
Apache Tribe.412 The proposed settlement quantified the San Carlos
Apache Tribe's water rights at 153,000 annual acre-feet, including 6000
acre-feet from the Gila Decree, 58,735 acre-feet of local Central Arizona
Project water, the existing San Carlos Apache 12,700 CAP allocation,
50,000 acre-feet of on-reservation tributary water from the Black, Salt, San
Pedro, and Gila Rivers, and 25,000 acre-feet of on-reservation groundwater
rights.4 13 Moreover, the federal government would be responsible for
constructing delivery systems for the water to reach the boundaries of the
San Carlos Apache Tribe's Reservation.4 14
In addition, House Bill 5539 called for the establishment of a
$36,200,000 San Carlos Apache Tribe Development Trust Fund. 4 15 The
Tribe could use both the principal and the interest of the fund for long-term
economic development programs. 416
However, the Tribe could not
distribute the funds on a per-capita basis. 4 17
C. ControversialIssues in Settlement Legislation
House Bill 5539 did not contain many controversial issues and was
purely a victim of a late start in the 101st Congress, as the associated
legislative process did not begin until August of 1990. Problems in House
Bill 5539, like the Ak Chin contribution provisions, may have emerged

411. H.R.REP.No. 101-918, at 8.
412. Id at 20-21. This sweeping legal tradeoff stands in contrast to very specific legal
waivers outlined in other Indian claims settlement legislation in the 101st Congress. Id. at
14-15.
413. Id. at 14. The 58,735 annual acre-feet of CAP water would be transferred from nonIndian local communities, including 14,655 acre-feet of municipal and industrial CAP water
previously allocated to the local Phelps Dodge corporation; 3480 acre-feet of municipal and
industrial CAP water previously allocated to the city of Globe, AZ; 7300 acre-feet of CAP
water from local water project operators, Salt River Project and the Roosevelt Water
Conservation District; and any leftover water from the Ak-Chin Indian Community. Id.
414. Id. at 15.
415. Id at 14.
416. Id
417. Id. at 14-15.
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with more time; but the only controversial issue Congress actually debated
was the associated federal cost.4 18
The San Carlos Apache Tribe was willing to slash in half the claims it
was making in the Arizona General Stream Adjudication of the Gila River
to expedite the process and receipt of a trust fund. 41 9 The Tribe felt that the
bill's benefits were fair compensation for hundreds of years of hardships
420
due to federal failures to secure Winters rights for the San Carlos Apache.
The federal government expressed a willingness to negotiate, but felt that
the cost of the settlement as proposed was too high. 4 2 1 The CBO estimated
the federal cost at approximately $40 million.422 After accounting for debt
relief and the loss of water contract repayments, the federal cost could have
been as high as $53.1 million.42 3 Because the Tribe could lease the 51,000
CAP acre-feet for as much as $62 million in annual income, the federal
government wanted to reduce the proposed trust fund by the cost of the
settlement.424
But the relatively modest settlement size and the concomitant press of
litigation eventually forced a legislative settlement of the San Carlos
Apache's water rights claims.42 5 Indeed, the 102nd Congress passed
settlement legislation that provided the Tribe with approximately 76,860
acre-feet of water rights and funded settlement with $38,400,000.426 Thus,
the Tribe ultimately took less water rights, but the federal government had
to pay more in resolution dollars.
IX. Conclusion: Indian NaturalResource Claims Settlement Two Decades
Later
The 101st Congress took over a fledgling legislative initiative, Indian
natural resource claims resolution, and gave it some credibility and legs
moving forward. The settlements generally traded federal and local dollars
418. Id. The settlement included an Arizona State contribution of $3 million, and local
cost contributions of $500,000 from the Phelps Dodge Corporation and $100,000 from the
City of Safford, Arizona, to ease the fiscal burden on the federal government. Id.
419. Id. at 14.
420. Id. at 15.
421. Id. at 15-16.
422. Id. at 26-27.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 15.
425. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 2, at 829. Other sources chipped in an additional three
million dollars. Id.
426. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, H.R. 429, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, §§ 3702(a)(9), 3704, 3707 (1992).
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for reduced and quantified tribal water rights and resolution of any legal
claims. Successful legislation could not include any issues that were not
directly tied to Indian natural resources, as each of these tangential issues
involved a new set of political special interest forces and complicated the
process. Other similarities in the settlements were federal involvement in
negotiation and the promotion of tribal economic self-sufficiency.
The Fort Hall Water Claims Settlement Act of 1990 was a good model
for future negotiations regarding Indian water rights. Federal, local, state,
and tribal parties negotiated an agreement without resorting to costly
litigation.
The settlement awarded the Shoshone-Bannock with a
substantial financial award and quantified their water and water storage
rights once and for all. The Bill included clauses that helped ease the
transition of non-Indians to loss of water rights, established specific
procedures for compromising limited resources in times of low flow, and
even improved the environmental quality of the Grays Lake habitat. Any
discussion surrounding controversial elements of the Bill was in the context
of governmental partners working towards a mutual goal. Indeed,
Committee testimony was devoid of the strikingly different policy positions
that tribal, state, local, and federal representatives so often present in
arguing over details included in Indian claims settlement legislation.
The Fallon Paiute Shoshone proposal was another model piece of Indian
claims settlement legislation. Free of controversy and considered fiscally
reasonable by federal government representatives, Title 1 of Senate
Bill 3084 by itself would have been all but assured of executive approval.
The packaging of the Fallon Paiute Shoshone settlement with the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe settlement, however, was a legislative maneuver of
enormous risk. Although the Pyramid Lake settlement proposal addressed
environmental issues that tribal, state, local, and federal representatives
widely agreed upon, the settlement cost was highly controversial. As it
turned out, Title I was a strong enough settlement to carry the costly and
controversial Pyramid Lake provisions of Title 2 into public law.
The cost of completing the federal government's obligations under the
1965 Agreement with the Ute Indians of Utah was many times higher than
that of the proposed settlement costs included in Senate Bill 536 and House
Bill 1285 claims settlement legislation. Enormous costs had prevented the
Utes from receiving promised water entitlements. A legislative settlement
was an obvious solution, as Representative Nielson indicated in his
introduction of House Bill 1285, "There comes a time when promises must
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move from mere words to decisive action.427 Despite Indian and nonIndian support for the bills and obvious failure under the 1965 Agreement,
the federal government considered the proposed Ute settlement too costly.
The cost was far above that of any other previous Indian water-related
claims legislative settlement. Because the 1965 Agreement called for
completion of the programs by 2005, the federal government had some
breathing room for procrastination. The federal government's interest in
proposed Indian claims settlements remained reactive, motivated only by
pending litigation and mounting legal pressure for a settlement. Eventually,
the parties got to a settlement point by the 102nd Congress.
Likewise, the proposed San Carlos Apache Tribe water rights settlement
appeared to be a sound legislative initiative that was unfortunately shackled
by the constraints of time. Although controversial issues such as the AkChin provisions emerged during a full legislative process, House Bill 5539
was a solid foundation for a potential water rights claims settlement for the
San Carlos Apache Tribe. And ultimately, again, Congress settled claims
of the San Carlos Apache Tribe through legislation in the 102nd
Congress.428
The fact that the 101st Congress passed Indian water-claims settlements
for five Indian nations and only rejected two related bills is remarkable, and
was by far the most progress that Congress had achieved in settling Indian
water claims. The legislative maneuvering, resolution of controversial
issues, and total cost allotment were very impressive. The 102nd Congress,
in turn, completed the unfinished work of the 101st Congress.
Although subsequent legislative claims settlement initiatives have
remained piecemeal in nature, and although there is no congressional
appetite for the costs and complexities of comprehensive Indian natural
resource claims settlement legislation, the trend toward real advancement
continues. This trend reflects both a long-term federal interest in bringing
closure to outstanding Indian natural resource claims, and a disdain for the
cost and uncertainty inherent in judicial resolution.
Indeed, there have been dozens of Indian natural resource legislative
settlements since the 101st Congress catalyzed the approach. The 102nd
Congress passed the unfinished Ute and San Carlos Apache settlements,
along with two other water settlements.429 In fact, there were fourteen
subsequent negotiated legislative claims settlements with Indian tribes as of
427. 135 CONG. REC. H5400 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1989) (statement of Rep. Howard C.
Nielson).
428. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 2, at 823.
429. Id.
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2010.430 By 2010, legislative claims settlements affecting more than forty
Indian tribes had been negotiated431 involving more than $1.1 billion in
funding dollars.432 Legislative claims settlements with Indian tribes "can be
exceptions to the modern wisdom that the era of building large federal
waters projects is over."4 33
The prospects for comprehensive Indian natural resource claims
settlement legislation may be slow going and incremental, but unresolved
Indian natural resource claims must be addressed. As such, the federal
government and involved local interests are incentivized to seek resolution,
and legislative claims settlements are one viable option. For tribes,
legislative settlements resolve uncertainties and save time, money and
effort.434
An analysis of Indian water-related claims legislation over the past two
decades reveals several patterns. The extinguishment of Winters claims
hinges on the fulfillment of those rights or a substantial monetary
settlement. If Indian nations cannot obtain full water rights along with their
lease revenue potential, then they must receive a settlement fund to
purchase such rights and/or generate income for the tribe. However, any
piece of Indian claims legislation that appears expensive is too politically
burdensome to pass Congress. Congress generally will not justify large
settlement expenditures for a small population Indian nation.
The federal government would prefer to litigate and not pay any kind of
settlement, but a claims bill that contains a federal payment of less than
$100 million is a tiny cost allocation in comparison with the enormous
federal budget and helps avoid the political fallout associated with vetoing
an Indian claims bill. The Indian claims bill becomes yet another small
pork barrel project in the federal budget.43 5 Federal representatives may
voice opposition to the cost of a bill and then support it anyway, because
"talking purse strings" is simply a negotiating strategy with Indian tribes
and Congress.436
When the controversy surrounding an Indian claims bill is only a
monetary debate over proportionality, the bill stands a good chance of being
passed. But once a bill contains a costly settlement in excess of $100
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 822.
Interview with Steven M. Tullberg, supra note 27.
Id.
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million or includes controversial issues that are not intrinsically related to
Indian water rights, it becomes linked to political baggage that overwhelms
congressional focus.
In spite of these settlements, many Indian nations still remain without
water rights settlements. Water is a "matter of life and death" in the West
and over 400 Indian nations have not settled their Winters claims.43 7 The
federal government therefore needs to make a more broad-based effort to
deal with American Indian water rights in general rather than slowly
passing patchwork legislation. The political and economic costs of
comprehensive American Indian water rights settlement would be
enormous, but considering the amount of Indian nations with pending
Winters litigation, the current legislative settlement pace is unacceptable
from the standpoint of responsible fiscal management and resolution of
contingent liabilities.
At a minimum, the amount of annual successful Indian water rights
legislative settlements should increase. Tribes are able to use legislative
settlements to deflect erosions in or attacks on tribal water rights, or as one
weapon in the arsenal designed to obtain greater rights. For a few tribes,
the benefits have been enormous; but the majority of American Indians do
not reap the benefits of these settlements. At the early part of this century,
Carlos Montezuma eerily predicted that if the federal government did not
"heed and do what is right . .. they will have litigators . . . to contend with

in the future because the next generation of Indians will be lawyers."438
Another problem is with the federally preferred negotiation process
itself. At the outset, it may appear that the government's willingness to
negotiate is nothing but good news for American Indian nations. However,
a singular policy of negotiation can limit or compromise a tribe's potential
to litigate based on the Winters doctrine.439 In addition, federal criteria for
negotiation such as finality of pending court cases and a settlement that
does not exceed legal risks are based on the assumption that there is
pending litigation. In a classic Catch-22, tribal representatives must litigate
to avoid litigation through a legislative settlement. The federal government
calls the shots by determining what is controversial and what will stall the
passing of a bill in legislative settlements, despite the fact that it is the
American Indians who hold the legal upper hand - armed with the Winters
doctrine. This paradox has caused lawyer Steven Tullberg to call the

437. JONES, supra note 23, at 69.
438. IVERSON, supranote 90, at 122.

439. Zah, supra note 30, at 77.
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Winters strategy a "wooden sword," since the government possesses an
even bigger sword than Congress' plenary power to terminate recognition
of Indian governments at will.440 Indeed, some would argue that legislative
claims settlements are simply the penultimate submission of tribes in the
face of federal dominance.
The history of settlements between the federal government and Indian
nations is a sorry one indeed, and there are certainly no assurances for the
enactment or implementation of any future legislative settlements. Navajo
Chairman Peter Zah notes, "The experience of the tribes which have
reached settlements has been bad. Why should we follow that road, which
forces us to give up our valuable water rights in return for paper projects
which are never built.' '
Still, the federal government has indeed continued to peck away at
American Indian natural resource claims legislative settlements on an asnecessary basis. The resolution of water rights allows Indian nations to
continue the process of maintaining tribal self-sufficiency through the
utilization of legal natural resource rights. Passamaquoddy leader John
Stevens' reaction to a land settlement that his Nation reached was, "Now
we have a future, not just a past."442
But the settlement of Indian water rights must progress faster. Although
competing interests for water and federal money inhibit the pace of
resolution, the federal government can take a more active role in initiating
settlement legislation. Beyond Washington, there is a more pressing need
than that of the political game, according to author John Folk-Williams:
The governments can argue endlessly about where the authority
of one ends and that of the other begins, but the tribal members
and the non-Indian citizens want to see a little more than that.
They want to know that they have an economic and a cultural
future securely based in careful water use and management.4 3
Representatives of the federal government did a good, albeit selfinterested, job regarding Indian water-related claims for the Zuni, Fort
McDowell Yavapai, Fort Hall, Pyramid Lake Paiute, Fallon ShoshoneBannock, Ute, and San Carlos Apache Tribes in the 101st and 102nd
Congress. Since then, Congress has continued legislative settlements,
440. Interview with Steven M. Tullberg, supra note 27.
441. Richardson, supra note 24, at 79.
442. Robert H. White, Indians'New Harvest,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at A27.
443. John A. Folk-Williams, State and Indian Governments: Are New Relationships
Regarding Water Possible?, in INDIAN WATER 1985, supra note 16, at 72.
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making inroads through the margins of the larger American Indian natural
resource claims problem. But the federal government must defy historical
patterns now by settling water and resource claims of more than 400
remaining American Indian nations.
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